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REVIVING THE FEDERAL CRIME OF
GRATUITIES
Sarah N. Welling*

The federal crime of gratuities prohibits people from giving gifts to federal public
officials if the gift is tied to an official act. Both the donor and the donee are liable.
The gratuities crime is dysfunctional in two main ways. It is overinclusive in that it
covers conduct indistinguishable from bribery. It is underinclusive in that it does
not cover conduct that is clearly dangerous: gifts to public officials because of
their positions that are not tied to a particular official act.
This Article argues that Congress should extend the crime of gratuities to cover
gifts because of an official’s position rather than leaving the crime to cover only
gifts because of particular official acts. The danger to bias-free government
because of gifting based on official positions is demonstrated in recent research on
influence and reciprocity. The rule for reciprocity is powerful and hard to fight
because participants are generally unaware it is operating on them. Gifting
officials based on their positions is not adequately controlled by mandated
disclosure or ethics prohibitions. This Article urges Congress to amend the
gratuities crime to expand it and avoid the dangers of overcriminalization by
inserting mens rea terms into the crime. The appropriate mens rea terms are
knowledge of the facts for donees and knowledge of the facts and law for donors.
Congress should also address the overbreadth of the crime by taking one situation,
when donors transfer value to donees because of future official acts, out of the
gratuities crime because it is indistinguishable from the crime of bribery. This
Article proposes amendments to implement these changes in terms familiar to the
federal criminal law.
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INTRODUCTION
The little-known federal crime called gratuities prohibits giving gifts to
federal public officials if the gift is tied to an official act.1 Gratuities is a political
corruption crime, a junior varsity version of bribery. Both the donor/private citizen
and the donee/public official are liable, and liable to the same extent.2 The
gratuities crime was enacted in 1962 and became effective in 1963.3 The crime
needs to be amended after our 50 years of experience with it.
The gratuities crime is dysfunctional in two main ways. It is overinclusive
in that it covers conduct indistinguishable from bribery.4 It is underinclusive in that
it does not cover conduct that is clearly dangerous—namely, gifts to public
officials because of their office.5 Recent research shows how dangerous these gifts
are in terms of influencing public officials based on the rule of reciprocity. The
urge humans have to reciprocate is powerful and unconscious.6 Based on this
research, when a donor transfers value to a donee, the injury to society is sufficient
in terms of biased officials to warrant treating the conduct as criminal.
Thus, the gratuities crime should be broadened to include gifts that are
given to public officials because of their official positions but are not tied to a
particular act. The United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California case,
decided by the Supreme Court in 1999, established that such gifts are not covered
by the gratuities statute.7 The Court’s main rationale was that the plain words of
the statute require that the donor give the gift “for or because of any official act.”8
The Court reached a defensible conclusion based on the words in the statute.9 The
statutory language should be amended to cover gifts to public officials based on
their positions. In this situation, even if the government cannot prove that the gift
was tied to a particular official act, the gift is harmful and dangerous because it
will lead to bias in the public official’s conduct based on the human inclination to
reciprocate.10
This Article first proposes that Congress amend the gratuities statute to
correct these problems and second suggests a seamless and practical way to do so.
Congress should extend the crime of gratuities to cover the situation where a donor
transfers value to donees because of their positions. Prohibiting this conduct under
criminal law is the best way to control it; merely mandating disclosure of the
gifting or treating it under the ethics rules is not an effective method of control.

1.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012).
2.
Id. Hereinafter, private citizen donors will simply be referred to as donors
and donee public officials will be referred to as donees.
3.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201.
4.
See infra Part III.
5.
See infra Part V.A.
6.
See infra Part V.B.1–2.
7.
526 U.S. 398, 406–08 (1999).
8.
Id.
9.
See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
10.
See infra Part V.B.1–2.
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Concerns raised by potential overcriminalization11 may be addressed with the
usual criminal law technique of adding a mens rea element to the statute. As of
now, the statute has no mens rea term, and the courts have failed to develop a
coherent theory of mens rea for the crime.12 Amending the statute to add a mens
rea term will not only avoid the dangers of overcriminalization but will also
eliminate confusion regarding the elements of the crime,13 and send the job of
defining the elements back to the appropriate institution—Congress.
Based on an analysis of the dangers and interests involved, this Article
proposes adding mens rea terms that distinguish between donors and donees.
Although courts have recognized that the liability of donors and donees is not
interdependent,14 the proposal to impose different mens rea requirements for the
two types of defendants has not been raised in legal literature. Congress should
amend the gratuities statute to provide that donors are liable only if they know both
the facts and the law, and donees are liable only if they know the facts. These mens
rea best suit the actors because donees can be expected to know the law while
donors should be protected from criminal liability unless they understand they are
doing something wrong.
This Article begins by describing the current elements and basic rationale of
the gratuities crime in Part I. It then separates the situations to which the crime
applies into four categories of conduct to examine the scope and application of the
crime. Part II covers the situation when a donor gives something to a public
official because of a personal act or relationship; the Article concludes that the
crime appropriately does not cover this conduct. Part III covers situations where
the donor gives something to a public official because of future official acts; Part
III concludes that the crime does apply to this situation, but that its application is
too broad because it is indistinguishable from bribery. Part IV covers situations
where the donor gives something to a public official because of past official acts
and concludes that the gratuities crime covers this conduct and works well. Part V
discusses situations where the donor gives something to a public official not
because of an identifiable official act, but rather because of the donee’s position
generally; this Part concludes that the crime of gratuities does not apply to this
situation currently, but it should. Part V then explains my proposal to expand the
crime to cover gifts received because of official position and to avoid
overcriminalization by adding mens rea terms. Finally, Part VI places these
situations on a continuum of harm and, somewhat less theoretically, proposes

11.
See George D. Brown, The Gratuities Debate and Campaign Reform: How
Strong is the Link?, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2006); Richard E. Myers II, Adaptation
and Resiliency in Legal System: Complex Times Don’t Call for Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1849, 1865–68 (2011).
12.
See infra Part V.D.2.a.
13.
See infra note 22.
14.
See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing
United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 340
F.2d 421, 424–25 (4th Cir. 1965)).
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specific amendments to the statute to implement the suggestions.15

I. BACKGROUND OF THE CRIME
A. Birth and Elements
The crime of gratuities prohibits transfers of value to federal public
officials because of an official act.16 It became a crime in 1963 as part of a series
of laws designed to deal with conflicts of interest in federal employees.17 The
particular statute, titled Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, actually
prohibits two crimes, bribery and gratuities.18 The term gratuities does not appear
in the statute19 but is an accepted nickname for the crime defined in § 201(c)(1) of
the statute20 which states:
(c) Whoever—
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge
of official duty—
(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of
value to any public official, former public official, or person
selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act

15.
This Article excludes discussion of transfers of value to federal public
officials that qualify as campaign contributions. Such contributions raise issues of
constitutionality and campaign finance policy beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, On Political Corruption, 124
HARV. L. REV. 118 (2010). After this exclusion, the issues that remain to be discussed
include gifts to federal public officials, including elected officials, in forms other than cash,
and any kind of gift, including cash, given to federal public officials who are appointed
rather than elected. This Article uses the term public official to include federal employees in
all branches of government at all levels. Professor Kathleen Clark has pointed out that some
provisions exclude particular federal employees. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough
Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 58
n.2; see also, e.g., Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch;
Proposed Amendments Limiting Gifts from Registered Lobbyists and Lobbying
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 56330 (proposed Sept. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt.
2635) (proposing a regulation in executive branch gift rules to eliminate distinct treatment
for career workers and political appointees).
16.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012).
17.
The statute became effective in 1963 as part of an act codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201–18 that had no name, but the chapter where it was codified, Chapter 11 of Title 18,
is called “Bribery, Graft and Conflicts of Interest.” Roswell Perkins of the New York Bar,
drafter of the statute, characterized the purpose as limiting government conflicts of interest.
See Roswell B. Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1113,
1113 n.2, 1114–15 (1963).
18.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201.
19.
Id.
20.
See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 400
(1999) (describing § 201(c)(1) as “the illegal gratuity statute”); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.2 (2010); Brown, supra note 11, at 1375–76.
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performed or to be performed by such public official, former
public official, or person selected to be a public official; or
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person
selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by
law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or
indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to
receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed by such official
or person[.]21

The basic idea of the crime is that giving anything of value to a federal
public official for or because of an official act is a crime for both the donor and the
donee.22 The term public official includes all persons acting for or on behalf of the
U.S. government.23 The statute describes things that may not be given as “anything
of value.”24 Official acts include any decision on any matter that may be pending
or may be brought before a public official.25 Some examples of the gratuities crime
are described below.26

21.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1).
22.
See, e.g., United States v. Hoffmann, 556 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2009)
(affirming jury instruction stating that crime had three elements: defendant gave
unauthorized things of value to a federal employee for or because of an official act); see
also United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, 240
F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the district court correctly instructed that gratuities
crime has three separate elements: defendant knowingly gave thing of value to public
official for or because of official act); United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding that a jury instruction was proper that had three elements for the crime of
giving an illegal gratuity); United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(finding five elements to the illegal gratuity offense). Commentators have explored the
elements of the crime. See generally Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a Meat Axe: Using
Honest Services Fraud to Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
929 (2009); Charles B. Klein, What Exactly Is an Unlawful Gratuity After United States v.
Sun-Diamond Growers?, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 116 (1999); Joseph R. Weeks, Bribes,
Gratuities and the Congress: The Institutionalized Corruption of the Political Process, the
Impotence of Criminal Law to Reach it, and a Proposal for Change, 13 J. LEGIS. 123
(1986).
23.
Public official is defined as “an officer or employee or person acting for or
on behalf of the United States or any department, agency or branch of Government
thereof . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1).
24.
Id. § 201(c)(1)(A)–(B).
25.
Id. § 201(a)(3).
[T]he term “official act” means any decision or action on any question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in
such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or
profit.
Id.; see generally United States v. Valdes, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (interpreting
“official act”).
26.
See infra Part V.
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The main limit on the crime is that transfers of value to public officials
are prohibited only if they are given or received “for or because of any official
act.”27 This phrase obviously excludes from the crime gifts given to federal
officials for or because of birthdays, friendship, or other personal or emotional
reasons.28 The Supreme Court has further construed this term “for or because of an
official act” to require a link between the gift to the public official and a particular
official act.29 The crime is not established by proof that a public official received a
gift because of his official position or because of some undefined official act;
rather, the gift to the official must be linked to a particular official act.30
The statute also specifies the timing of the gift to the public official vis-ávis the official act.31 Gifts are prohibited if they are given or received because of
any official act “performed or to be performed.”32 Thus, gifts to public officials are
prohibited both for past official acts and for future official acts.
B. Rationale
Roswell Perkins, the drafter of 18 U.S.C. § 201, first articulated the
rationale for the crime of gratuities by noting that “[t]he deleterious results of
[allowing public officials to accept transfers of economic value from private
sources] may range all the way from natural gratitude to economic dependence.”33
Leading commentator George Brown has identified and collected more specific
rationales for the crime;34 these generally focus on the threat that such gratuities
pose to democratic values.35 Permitting gifts to public officials allows officials to
use their public office for private gain.36 Gratuities raise the risk of preferential
treatment for donors and undermine equality of access to government services.37
27.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1).
28.
See infra Part II.
29.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 406, 414
(1999).
30.
Id. at 405–06.
31.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1).
32.
Id.
33.
Perkins, supra note 17, at 1119.
34.
See George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us—Salinas, SunDiamond, and Two Views of the Anticorruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747, 769–70 (2000)
[hereinafter Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us]; George D. Brown, The Gratuities
Offense and the RICO Approach to Independent Counsel Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2045,
2051–54 (1998) [hereinafter Brown, The Gratuities Offense].
35.
Brown, supra note 11, at 1398.
36.
Brown, The Gratuities Offense, supra note 34, at 2054 (citing Beth Nolan,
Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of
Government Officials, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 72, 80–81 (1992)).
37.
Id.; Nolan, supra note 36, at 80 & n.89, 81. The Fifth Circuit explained:
The purpose of [the gratuities statute] is to reach any situation in which
the judgment of a government agent might be clouded because of
payments or gifts made to him by reason of his position “otherwise than
as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty.” Even if
corruption is not intended by either the donor or the donee, there is still a
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Gratuities increase the risk that donees will have divided loyalties.38 Gifting to
public officials contributes to inefficient government.39 Gratuities are really bribes,
but the government cannot prove the quid pro quo or the basis for the exchange.40
And, finally, gratuities have the appearance of impropriety.41
C. Four Applications
The situations where the gratuities crime might apply can be divided into
four categories. These are
1.

Donor gives to a public official because of personal reasons.

2.

Donor gives to a public official because of a future official act.

3.

Donor gives to a public official because of a past official act.

4.

Donor gives to a public official because of his or her official position.

These four applications are each discussed below.

tendency in such a situation to provide conscious or unconscious
preferential treatment of the donor by the donee, or the inefficient
management of public affairs. These statutes, like the predecessor
legislation, are a congressional effort to eliminate the temptation inherent
in such a situation . . . .
United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978). Shortly after the crime was
enacted, the Second Circuit explained:
The awarding of gifts thus related to an employee’s official acts is an
evil in itself, even though the donor does not corruptly intend to
influence the employee’s official acts, because it tends, subtly or
otherwise, to bring about preferential treatment by Government officials
or employees, consciously or unconsciously, for those who give gifts as
distinguished from those who do not. . . . The iniquity of the procuring of
public officials, be it intentional or unintentional, is so fatally destructive
to good government that a statute designed to remove the temptation for
a public official to give preferment to one member of the public over
another, by prohibiting all gifts ‘for or because of any official act,’ is a
reasonable and proper means of insuring the integrity, fairness and
impartiality of the administration of the law.
United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1965).
38.
Brown, The Gratuities Offense, supra note 34, at 2054 (citing Evans, 572
F.2d at 480; Perkins, supra note 17, at 1119).
39.
Evans, 572 F.2d at 480.
40.
Brown, The Gratuities Offense, supra note 34, at 2054–55 (citing Daniel
Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 784, 850 (1985)).
41.
Id. at 2054 (citing SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FED. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS,
ASSN. OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE 219
(1960)); see also Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (stating that gratuities crime strikes at “the appearance of evil” (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
87-478, at 19 (1961))).
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II. GIFTING BECAUSE OF A PERSONAL ACT OR RELATIONSHIP:
APPROPRIATELY NOT CRIMINAL
When a donor gives a gift to a federal public official because of a
personal act or relationship, it is not a crime under the gratuities statute.42 This
outcome is fine and needs no change, but a brief discussion of this limit on the
crime is helpful for perspective on the conduct that is covered by the crime.
Personal gifts are excluded from the crime by the statutory language that
requires the gratuities to be given “for or because of an official act.”43 Official acts
include any decision on any matter that may be pending or may be brought before
a public official.44 If the gift is for or because of friendship or social purpose, it is
not covered by the gratuity statute.45
To establish that a gift was given or received because of an official act,
the government must prove that the gift was in some part based on an official act.46
The gift need not be based exclusively on an official act; this element is met if the
gift is based in part on the donee’s official act and in part on personal reasons.47
The courts developed this mixed-motive doctrine based on the rationale that a legal
purpose should not immunize participants who also have an illegal purpose.48
The courts have identified factors useful to distinguish personal gifts from
gifts based on an official act. These factors are whether the donor treated the gift as
an expense to be reimbursed by an employer;49 whether the donor deducted the gift
42.
43.
44.

See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012).
Id. § 201(a)(3) provides:
[T]he term “official act” means any decision or action on any question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in
such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or
profit.
Id. § 201(a)(3); see generally Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1322–23 (interpreting “official act”).
45.
E.g., United States v. Hoffmann, 556 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d
1076, 1080 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
46.
See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, Nos. 92-5446, 92-5501, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15310, at *17 (4th Cir. June 23, 1993) (unpublished); Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 99–100;
Standefer, 610 F.2d at 1080; United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398,
413–14 (1999). But cf. Hoffmann, 556 F.3d at 874–75 (stating that theory-of-defense
instruction requiring acquittal if donor gave things “solely” because of goodwill and
friendship was improper but instructions taken as whole were accurate; conviction
affirmed).
47.
Gaines, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15310, at *17.
48.
See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 683 (2d Cir. 1990) (“A valid
purpose that partially motivates a transaction does not insulate participants in an unlawful
transaction from criminal liability.”); see also United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 245–
46 (3d Cir. 2011) (approving that jury instructions that allowed conviction of mail fraud
based on dual purpose).
49.
See, e.g., Hoffmann, 556 F.3d at 873 n.2, 874, 878.
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as a business expense;50 whether the participants had a history of gift-giving before
the donee became an official;51 whether the gift-giving continued after the donee
was no longer an official;52 whether the donor gave comparable gifts to others;53
whether the donor and donee had a social relationship outside their official
capacities;54 whether the gifts fell into a pattern tracking the official acts;55 and
whether the gift was unusually valuable.56
With this limit in place, old friends from school may continue to share
sports tickets and meals after one goes to work for the federal government based
on their pre-existing personal relationship. College roommates may continue to
exchange birthday and holiday gifts even after one of them becomes the Secretary
of Commerce. Personal friends may give each other gifts, and this ability is not
extinguished by the gratuities crime when one becomes a federal official.

III. GIFTING BECAUSE OF FUTURE OFFICIAL ACTS: COVERAGE BY
GRATUITY CRIME IS TOO BROAD AND INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM
BRIBERY
The gratuities crime covers gifts based on official acts “performed or to
be performed.”57 The drawback to this language is that it is so broad that
sometimes the gratuities crime is indistinguishable from bribery. Congress
intended bribery and gratuities to be different crimes, with bribery being the more
serious.58 Bribery does not require that the public official actually be influenced.59
Instead, bribery only requires a mens rea of intent to influence (in the case of a
donor) or the intent to be influenced (in the case of a donee). This mens rea for
bribery—an intent to influence or to be influenced—is the main distinction
between the crimes of bribery and gratuities.60

50.
Id. at 873 n.2.
51.
See Standefer, 610 F.2d at 1080.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
See United States v. Gaines, Nos. 92-5446, 92-5501, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
15310, at *18–19 (4th Cir. June 23, 1993) (unpublished); Standefer, 610 F.2d at 1080.
55.
See United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 1988).
56.
See, e.g., Gaines, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15310, at *18; Biaggi, 853 F.2d at
99–100.
57.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012).
58.
See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–08
(1999). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(4) (indicating a 15-year maximum sentence for
bribery), with id. § 201(c)(3) (noting a two-year maximum sentence for gratuities).
59.
See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972); United States v.
Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1978).
60.
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404 (stating that “distinguishing feature” of
bribery is that it requires intent to influence or to be influenced); see 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1);
see also United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 728–29 (2d Cir. 1966); Brown, supra note
11, at 1376.
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Although this mens rea is the main difference, the language of the
gratuities statute that refers to “any official act performed or to be performed”61 is
confusing because it expands the crime of gratuities so much that it is
indistinguishable from the crime of bribery. Based just on this statutory language,
the crimes of gratuities based on future official acts and bribery were hard to
distinguish before Sun-Diamond was decided.62 After Sun-Diamond required the
government to prove a link between the gift and a particular official act, the crimes
of gratuities and bribery became impossible to distinguish.63
The problem arises when a donor gives a gift to a donee because of an
official act “to be performed.” An act “to be performed” is a particular act in the
future.64 In an effort to give this language meaning and explain how a donor can
give a gift because of an act to be performed in the future without it also being a
bribe—i.e., without the donor intending to influence the donee’s conduct—courts
and commentators have conjured up the idea of a “forward-looking gratuity.”65
61.
62.

18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
As the D.C. Circuit explains:
Where the sttaute [sic] does cause great difficulty for a trial judge, a
difficulty which we hold proved fatal to the conviction in this case, is
that in addition to the problem of drawing a distinction between one
definable offense and innocent conduct, where both offenses are charged
a trial judge must also draw a tripartite distinction between conduct with
the defined intent to constitute an offense under the bribery section (c),
conduct with the requisite intent to constitute an offense under the
gratuity section (g), and conduct with an intent which constitutes no
offense at all. The trial judge strove manfully—and judicially—make
[sic] these fine distinctions for the jury. Yet we have found it difficult
ourselves, with adequate time to reflect and ponder, to understand the
subtle distinctions made in the written text of the instructions. . . .

We do not fault the District Judge here for his failure to illuminate the
obscure; it may not be easy under this statute to make the tripartite
distinction, although we think it is clearly possible to draw instructions
making sufficiently clear the line between guilt and innocence under
each subsection of section 201 taken separately.
United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 78–79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Brown, The Gratuities
Offense, supra note 34, at 2061–62.
63.
PATRICK LEAHY, PUBLIC CORRUPTION PROSECUTION IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF
2007, S. REP. NO. 110-239, at 6 (2007) (stating that the holding of Sun-Diamond “makes the
[gratuity] statute nearly impossible to differentiate from the federal bribery statute . . . .”);
Brown, supra note 11, at 1372, 1388.
64.
See supra notes 27, 61 and accompanying text.
65.
The “forward-looking gratuity” was first identified in United States v.
Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 841–42 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, United States v. Shaffer
III, 240 F. 3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The D.C. Circuit described the gratuities crime as falling
into three categories based on “temporal focus”: (1) gifts that were a reward for past action;
(2) gifts that were intended to entice a public official to maintain a position previously
staked out; and (3) gifts given with the intent to induce a public official to propose, take, or
shy away from future official act. Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 841–42. The third category of
gratuities crime was nicknamed “forward-looking gratuities” by commentators. See Brown,
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The theory of a forward-looking gratuity is that the donor gives a gift to a public
official because the public official has committed to do a particular act in the
future; the commitment is in the past, but the act is “to be performed” in the future.
The gift is a gratuity because it is a reward or tip for the commitment to do the
act.66
Yet in this situation, when the donor is giving the gift because of a future
act, surely the donor is giving the gift not because of past conduct (the
commitment in words—which is helpful but not conclusive) but because the donor
wants to ensure that the donee carries through with the act. The donor wants to
lock in the public official. In other words, the donor intends to influence the
conduct of the donee. The idea that the donor is grateful for the past verbal
commitment and rewards it with a gift while remaining indifferent as to whether
the commitment is kept and the act is done is not persuasive. Rather, in this
situation, the donor has the intent of influencing the public official to complete the
act the public official committed to perform.67 This is bribery.68
The confusion between bribery and gratuities because of particular future
official acts is exacerbated by the jury instruction on inferring intent, which is an
instruction given by every district court. That instruction provides:
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant’s state of mind can be
proved directly, because no one can read another person’s mind and
tell what that person is thinking. . . . But a defendant’s state of mind
can be proved indirectly from the surrounding circumstances.
. . . You may . . . consider the natural and probable results of any
acts that the defendant knowingly did . . . , and whether it is
reasonable to conclude that the defendant intended those results.69

Thus, juries are specifically instructed on their freedom to infer intent. When the
gratuities prosecution is based on gifting because of a particular future official act,
the jury will be instructed on its freedom to infer the defendant’s intent to
influence the donee.
The conclusion that the crime of gratuities is difficult to distinguish from
bribery is not a new idea. Commentators have documented the confusion regarding
the line between the two crimes over the years.70 The only point I would add is my
supra note 1120, at 1380 (describing the Sun-Diamond Court’s treatment of “forwardlooking gratuities”); see generally Klein, supra note 22 (defining the scope of the forwardlooking gratuity in the wake of Sun-Diamond).
66.
See Klein supra note 22, at 118–19.
67.
See Eliason, supra note 22, at 980 & n.219.
68.
See supra notes 45–47, 57–60.
69.
SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 2.08(2)–(4)
(2001).
70.
Brown, supra note 11, 1372, 1376; Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us,
supra note 34, at 771 (describing the overlap between crimes of bribery and gratuities
(citing Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics,
32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 795–97 (1985)); Klein, supra note 22, at 129; see also Eliason,
supra note 22, at 960, 985; Weeks, supra note 22, at 132–33.
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suggestion on how to solve the confusion. I propose eliminating the forwardlooking gratuity altogether and letting that conduct be covered by the crime of
bribery.
The best way to eliminate forward-looking gratuities is for Congress to
amend the statute to delete the language referring to acts “or to be performed.” The
statutory language in the gratuities subsection would be changed from “[f]or or
because of an official act performed or to be performed” to “[f]or or because of an
official act performed.” Deleting the phrase “or to be performed” from the gratuity
subsections of the statute is a simple and clean way to put an end to the forwardlooking gratuity and the resulting garble between the crimes of bribery and
gratuities.

IV. GIFTING BECAUSE OF PAST OFFICIAL ACTS: COVERAGE BY
GRATUITY CRIME WORKS WELL
In the situation where a donor transfers a gift to a donee because of an
official act the donee did in the past, the current gratuities crime works well. The
donor’s gift can be characterized as a reward, a tip, or a type of thank-you.71 This
conduct is dangerous at a level that makes its categorization as the crime of
gratuities appropriate: This conduct is not so innocuous that it should not be
considered a crime at all, yet the risk of influencing the donee’s conduct is not so
great as to be characterized as the crime of bribery.

V. GIFTING BECAUSE OF AN OFFICIAL’S POSITION: NOT COVERED
BY GRATUITY CRIME BUT SHOULD BE
A. Not Covered Under Current Gratuities Statute
Let us imagine a situation where donors give to public officials presents
that are not because of personal reasons and that are not tied to particular official
acts. Let’s imagine that the donor is giving the presents to the public official just to
curry favor, create general goodwill, and to maintain access to the official. One of
the Supreme Court Justices posed this hypothetical during the oral argument in the
case:
QUESTION: Do you say [the gift to the public official] has to be
because of some particular official act?
MR. BLOOM [attorney for defendant Sun-Diamond]: . . . [W]e do
believe that—that the statute calls for a link between a gift on one
hand and some specific or identifiable official act.
QUESTION: Specific or identifiable. Well, I mean—I mean, let’s
say I’m—I’m AT&T, and I just give enormous quantities of money
to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.
71.
See, e.g., United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d 195, 205 (D.D.C. 2009)
(noting that the gratuities charge was sufficient where donor Ring gave sports tickets to
donee as a “thank you” for help rendered earlier); see also Eliason, supra note 22, at 938,
945.
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....
QUESTION: That doesn’t violate this Act?
....
QUESTION: Saying, you know, I'm not asking you to do anything
in particular. I have no particular case in mind.
(Laughter.)
....
QUESTION: I just—I just want you—just—I just want you to be a
friend; that’s all.
(Laughter.)
MR. BLOOM: I strongly suspect that if I had matters before the
FCC or before any department, it’s not going to be terribly difficult
for the prosecutor, especially with the resources of the grand jury, to
be able to identify matters.
....
QUESTION: No, no. Wait. You have to take my hypothetical.
There is no particular matter that AT&T mentioned to the
Chairman. It just said, you know, I just love Chairmen of the FCC.
They are wonderful people. They’re—you know, they could make a
lot more money elsewhere. I—this is in appreciation of your taking
all this time out to serve the people. And I—you know, here’s a
couple of million dollars.
(Laughter.)
MR. BLOOM: Well, I strongly suspect that a jury could find that it
was for an act, if one were identified. But using your hypothetical—
QUESTION: No particular act.
MR. BLOOM: I understand, sir. Using your hypothetical, I would
suspect that that person could be charged under one of the other
statutes—the salary supplementation statute. It sounds like he’s
giving the money because of the job and because of his acts as—
pursuant—
QUESTION: My question was—was not whether he could be
charged under one of the other statutes. It’s whether he can be
charged under this statute.
MR. BLOOM: Right. And our answer is no.
QUESTION: Is no?
MR. BLOOM: Is no.72

72.
Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of
Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (No. 98-131), 1999 U.S. Trans Lexis 17, at *29–31.
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Although this colloquy generated plenty of laughter, the Supreme Court
embraced the argument unanimously, holding that the gratuities crime did not
apply to gifting because of an official’s position.73 This result is perhaps defensible
because the language in the gratuities statute always provided that the transfer of
value had to be given or received because of an official “act.”74
However, as discussed below, social science research has established that
gifting to public officials that is not tied to a particular act, but rather is because of
their positions, is dangerous because it influences the participants and leads to
biased public officials.
B. Gifts to Public Officials Because of Their Positions are Dangerous
Research shows that gifting is dangerous in two basic ways. The
following Subsections illustrate that gifting is dangerous because: (1) it creates a
desire for the recipient to reciprocate, and (2) the desire to reciprocate arises from
the person’s unconscious.
1. Influence Research: The Urge to Reciprocate
The primary danger of gifting to public officials because of their position
is based on social science research on influence. This influence research shows
that a powerful way to affect how people behave is to trigger the built-in urge to
reciprocate. The basic human nature rule is, “[W]e should try to repay, in kind,
what another person has provided us . . . . [W]e are obligated to the future
repayment of favors, gifts, invitations and the like.”75
The urge to reciprocate, often called the norm or rule of reciprocity,76 is
an automatic human response77 based on internalized social norms, possibly with
an evolutionary basis.78 It is extensive in that all human societies subscribe to it,
73.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 408, 414
(1999).
74.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012).
75.
ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 19 (5th ed. 2009);
see also Robert B. Cialdini & Vladas Griskevicius, Social Influence, in ADVANCED SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 389 (Roy F. Baumeister & Eli J. Kinkel eds.,
2010) (stating reciprocation rule as “[o]ne should be more willing to comply with a request
from someone who has previously provided a favor or concession”); LESSIG, supra note 15,
at 107–15 (describing the federal government as a gift economy based on reciprocity).
76.
See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 22 (“reciprocity rule”); LESSIG, supra
note 15, at 109; Jerry M. Burger et al., The Norm of Reciprocity as an Internalized Social
Norm: Returning Favors Even When No One Finds Out, 4 SOC. INFLUENCE 11, 11–12
(2009); Mark A. Whatley et al., The Effect of a Favor on Public and Private Compliance:
How Internalized is the Norm of Reciprocity?, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 251, 251
(1999).
77.
CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 1–16.
78.
Id. at 20 (noting rule for reciprocation is “deeply implanted” in us); LESSIG,
supra note 15, at 132 (“We don’t need a Sigmund Freud here. We all recognize the drive
deep in our bones (or, more accurately, our DNA) to reciprocate.” (citing Robert L. Trivers,
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35 (1971))); Burger et al., supra
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and it permeates exchanges of every kind.79 The power of the rule of reciprocity is
fueled by a double whammy of feelings: We feel bad when we do not reciprocate
and find ourselves indebted,80 and we feel good when we do reciprocate.81 This
rule is so powerful that the urge to reciprocate can overwhelm other variables that
normally determine how a person acts.82
One of the classic experiments illustrating the power of the rule of
reciprocity was conducted by Dennis Regan.83 Two subjects were asked to rate
paintings as part of a study of art appreciation.84 Actually, one of the subjects was
an undercover associate of experimenter.85 During a break in the rating process,
the undercover associate left the room for a few minutes.86 In some cases, he
returned with two bottles of Coke, one for himself and one for the real subject.87 In
other cases, he returned empty-handed.88 After the paintings were all rated, the
undercover subject asked the real subject to do him a favor and buy some raffle
tickets the undercover subject was selling for 25 cents apiece.89 Subjects who had
received a coke bought twice as many raffle tickets as the subjects who had not
been given the prior favor.90 On average, subjects who had been given a 10-cent
drink bought two raffle tickets, amounting to 50 cents or a 500% return on the 10cent gift, and some bought as many as seven, amounting to $1.75 or a 1,750%
return on the 10-cent gift.91
Researchers have identified more particular characteristics of the rule for
reciprocity. One feature concerns uninvited first favors: Donees feel compelled to
reciprocate even for gifts they did not request.92 This response to uninvited gifts

note 76, at 17; Whatley et al., supra note 76, at 252; Jonah Lehrer, Kin and Kind, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 5, 2012, at 36.
79.
CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 19 (citing Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of
Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 161, 175 (1960)).
80.
Id. at 34 (pointing out that negative feelings of indebtedness, including both
internal discomfort and possibility of external shame, are psychologically costly); LESSIG
supra note 15, at 109–10 (describing the feeling of moral obligation in the gift economy of
the federal government).
81.
Ryan Goei & Franklin J. Boster, The Roles of Obligation and Gratitude in
Explaining the Effect of Favors on Compliance, 72 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 284, 285 (2005);
Whatley et al., supra note 76, at 258.
82.
CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 23–26.
83.
Dennis T. Regan, Effects of a Favor and Liking on Compliance, 7 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 627 (1971).
84.
Id. at 631.
85.
Id. at 630.
86.
Id. at 631.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 632.
90.
Id. at 634.
91.
See CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 24, 35 (describing Regan’s experiment).
92.
Id. at 31.
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developed so a person could initiate a relationship without a fear of loss.93 Another
feature of the rule for reciprocity is unequal exchanges. The rule of reciprocity
frequently triggers unequal exchanges because to be rid of the uncomfortable
feeling of indebtedness, people will often agree to a request for a substantially
larger return gift than one they received.94 Based on this propensity for unequal
exchanges, donors who intends to exploit this trait of human nature can maximize
what they receive in return.95
Another specific feature researchers have identified is that the value of
the gift is not that important. Even the smallest gifts often make donees feel
obligated to reciprocate.96 The rule for reciprocity is not affected by anonymity, so
even if no one will know whether the donee reciprocated, she still will feel an urge
and will do so.97 And the impact of the rule is enduring, so the desire to repay
fades over time only when the gift is relatively small.98
The original research on reciprocity was published by Alvin Gouldner in
1960.99 Over the years, researchers have replicated the results and further
investigated the rule of reciprocity.100 The leading authority today on influence

93.
Id. at 30 (“The [reciprocity] rule was established to promote the development
of reciprocal relationships between individuals so that one person could initiate such a
relationship without the fear of loss. If the rule is to serve that purpose, then an uninvited
first favor must have the ability to create an obligation.”).
94.
Id. at 33–34.
95.
Id. at 11, 28–31.
96.
LESSIG, supra note 15, at 111 (“And as economist Michele Dell’Era
demonstrates, the gifts necessary to make this system of reciprocity work need not be
large.”); Cialdini & Griskevicius, supra note 75, at 390 (“People often feel obligated to
reciprocate even the smallest gift.”); Jo-Ann Tsang, Gratitude for Small and Large Favors:
A Behavioral Test, 2 J. POSITIVE PSYCHOL. 157, 164 (2007) (explaining that although some
studies show that people report stronger feelings based on larger gifts or favors, value is not
a significant variable; “when people actually receive a favor from another person, the
present data suggest that the value of the favor may matter less; rather, ‘it’s the thought that
counts.’” (citation omitted)); see also Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices
That Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 295
JAMA 429, 430–31 (2006) (noting the “myth of small gifts” and citing influence research as
the basis for a proposal that academic medical centers prohibit all gifts from drug and
medical device companies to physicians).
97.
See Burger et al., supra note 76, at 17; Whatley et al., supra note 76, at 257–
58 (summarizing that reciprocity effect is not affected by anonymity variable).
98.
CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 20.
99.
See id. at 19 (citing Gouldner, supra note 79, 175); Goei & Boster, supra
note 81, at 284–85.
100.
See generally supra notes 75–98 (indicating relevant studies). Much of the
significant research was published by Dennis Regan in 1971. See Regan, supra notes 83–91.
Regan’s research is explained in several publications. See CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 22;
Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on Ethical Lobbying,
Campaign Contributions, Reciprocity, and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 10,
15–16 (2008) [hereinafter Susman, Private Ethics] (explaining Regan’s research); Thomas
M. Susman, Lobbying in the 21st Century—Reciprocity and the Need for Reform, 58
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generally, and specifically on how the rule of reciprocity influences human
behavior, is Robert Cialdini.101
This influence research has not found its way into the criminal law on
gratuities. The first work was published in 1960, just two years before Congress
adopted the gratuities crime, and it is not mentioned in the legislative history.102
When Congress adopted the crime, the data on influencing human behavior was
not widely known, nor had it been replicated by multiple studies as it has been
today.103 The courts have not relied on this influence research in the case law on
gratuities. Two commentators have noted the implications of the influence
research for government ethics and corruption, but they did not specifically discuss
implications for the crime of gratuities.104
The implications of this influence research for the crime of gratuities are
that all gifting to public officials because of their official position should be
prohibited. When the characteristics of the rule of reciprocity are applied in the
context of gifts to public officials because of their official position, the specific
dangers of these gifts become clear. First, because donees feel compelled to
reciprocate even uninvited first favors or gifts, gifts to donees compromise the
ability of the public officials to decide whom they are indebted to, and the choice
is put in the hands of donors.105 Second, because the rule frequently triggers
unequal exchanges, a donor who is so inclined can exploit this feature by giving a
small gift which may well trigger a larger return gift from the donee.106 Third, the
value of the gift the donor gives is not important; even the smallest gifts will make
donees feel obligated to reciprocate.107 Donees will feel the urge to reciprocate

ADMIN. L. REV. 737, 747–48 (2006) [hereinafter Susman, Lobbying] (detailing Regan’s
experiment).
101.
See generally CIALDINI, supra note 75; see also Cialdini & Griskevicius,
supra note 75, at 385–408. Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence:
Compliance and Conformity, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591 (2004); see also Susman, Private
Ethics, supra note 100, at 16 (citing Cialdini’s book); Susman, Lobbying, supra note 100, at
748 (discussing Cialdini’s book).
102.
See generally S. REP. NO. 2213 (1962).
103.
See Cialdini & Griskevicius, supra note 75, at 388–91 (2010) (collecting
numerous studies confirming the power of reciprocity); see also supra note 100.
104.
Cialdini notes that the strength of the reciprocity rule is evident in the
restrictions on gifts to legislative and judicial officials. CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 27.
Thomas Susman, an expert on government ethics and lobbying, provides the most detailed
treatment of the influence research, analyzing the power of reciprocity in the context of
lobbyists and elected officials. See, e.g., Susman, Private Ethics, supra note 100; Susman,
Lobbying, note 100. Other writers have mentioned it in passing. ALEXANDER J. FIELD,
ALTRUISTICALLY INCLINED? THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, AND THE
ORIGINS OF RECIPROCITY 17–18 (2001); Douglas A. Terry, Don’t Forget about Reciprocal
Altruism: Critical Review of the Evolutionary Jurisprudence Movement, 34 CONN. L. REV.
477, 503–04 (2002).
105.
See CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 31.
106.
Id. at 33.
107.
See supra note 96.
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even if the gesture remains anonymous to all but the donor and donee.108 And
finally, the feeling of indebtedness that the rule engenders in donees is enduring
and fades over time for only the most trivial gifts.
2. The Influence of Reciprocity is Unconscious
One characteristic of the rule of reciprocity makes it particularly
dangerous—namely, that persons acting under its influence are not aware of it; the
influence exerted by the rule of reciprocity is unconscious.109 This is because the
urge to reciprocate is an ingrained and automatic human response.110 The
automaticity of the response makes it difficult to control.111 Thus, even if the donor
and the donee have no plan to abide by the rule for reciprocity, they will likely
follow it unconsciously.112 This feature of the rule of reciprocity echoes the themes
of Daniel Kahneman’s research on the automaticity of unconscious thinking
patterns and responses.113 If they are asked if a gift affected them, donees can say
no and believe it. As Professor Cialdini explains:
Regularly, we hear [politicians] proclaiming total independence
from the feelings of obligation that influence everyone else.
. . . Excuse me if I, as a scientist, laugh. . . . Elected and appointed
officials often see themselves as immune to the rules that apply to
[the] rest of us . . . . But, to indulge them in this conceit when it
comes to the rule of reciprocity is not only laughable, it’s
dangerous.114

So, the public official can thoroughly and honestly deny that the gifting affected
his or her conduct, while the evidence shows that it probably did.
In sum, this influence research demonstrates that gifting to government
officials is dangerous to equal access in government without any link to a
particular act and that it is more threatening to the health of democratic governance
than was previously known. The impact of such gifting is to create an intolerable
temptation for public officials to act with bias in favor of the donor. And, to
exacerbate the situation, usually the donee is unaware of this impact. This research

108.

See Burger et al., supra note 76, at 17; Whatley et al., supra note 76, at 257–

58.
109.
LESSIG, supra note 15, at 114, 132; see also CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 27–
28; Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing
Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2005) (noting that many believe that conflicted
professionals are consciously and intentionally acting corruptly, whereas “considerable
research suggests that bias is more frequently the result of motivational processes that are
unintentional and unconscious”).
110.
LESSIG, supra note 15, at 114, 132.
111.
CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 45.
112.
Id. at 2–10 (discussing automatic human responses that operate as efficient
mental shortcuts); LESSIG, supra note 15, at 114, 132 (recognizing that the act of
reciprocating is often an unconscious human function).
113.
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
114.
CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 27.
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supports extending the ban on gifts beyond the one set of donors (lobbyists) and
donees (members of Congress)115 to all donors and all unelected federal officials.
Although it was understandable that Congress did not take this research into
account in 1962, it is indefensible to ignore it now. Based on this research,
Congress should expand the crime of gratuities to include gifts to public officials
unconnected to an official act.
C. Gifting Because of Position Should Be Prohibited
1. Disclosure Alone is Not an Effective Method of Control
One approach to control gifting to public officials is to require
disclosure.116 This regulatory technique is the easiest and most gentle form of
control. Disclosure is a popular approach these days117 and is used frequently in
the law.118 Disclosure requirements may be enforced through civil penalties,
criminal penalties, or both.119 However, disclosure is not an effective method of
controlling conduct. First, the goals of disclosure are unclear.120 If the theory is
115.
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 2 U.S.C. § 1613
(2012).
116.
E.g., Susman, Private Ethics, supra note 100, at 20–21 (maximizing
disclosure is one alternative to reduce impact of reciprocity norm when lobbyists give things
to elected legislators); Susman, Lobbying, supra note 100, at 750 (insisting in “full and
immediate disclosure” is the most important step to limit impact of reciprocity norm when
lobbyists give things to elected officials).
117.
Elizabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose . . . Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, at
SR1 (“[D]isclosure has become the go-to solution for a wide range of problems—from
unethical campaign financing to rising corporate carbon emissions . . . .”).
118.
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1), (b)(2)(A)–(K), (e)(2)(A)–(B), (e)(3) (2012)
(requiring national committees of political parties to report receipts and disbursements of
funds); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(1)(a)(3)(A)–(C), (c)(1)–(2), 7261(b)–(c) (2012) (prescribing
disclosure requirements for publicly held companies); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2013)
(requiring corporations to disclose executive compensation); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5, 226.17
(2013) (stating disclosure requirements under The Truth in Lending Act, 12 U.S.C. § 63806,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1647(c)(5), 1639(I), and 1639(h)); Transparency Reports and Reporting
of Physician Ownership or Investment Interests, 76 Fed. Reg. 78743 (proposed Dec. 19,
2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 402 and 403) (proposing regulation that physicians be
required to divulge financial interests); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RULE
XXVI, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 995 (2011) (requiring clerk to compile disclosure reports
filed under the Ethics in Government Act and to make them available to the public); see
also Julie Powell, An Appetite for Straight A’s, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at A23 (stating
that New York City restaurants are required to display their sanitary grade from health
inspectors); Editorial, What College Students Need to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, at
A18 (stating that the 1990 Student Right to Know Act requires colleges and universities that
receive federal aid to disclose graduation rates and that the 2008 Higher Education
Opportunity Act requires schools to offer a way for consumers to determine actual costs
after student aid is taken into account).
119.
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (2012) (imposing disclosure requirements on
lobbyists); id. § 1606 (2012) (providing civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance).
120.
Rosenthal, supra note 117 (citing Dr. Kevin Weinfurt, Professor of
Psychiatry, Duke Univ.).
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that mandated disclosure will deter people from the underlying conduct, we have
to assume that disclosers feel some shame or aversion.121 Often that assumption is
not warranted.122 Generally, disclosure laws have not been effective in deterring
conduct.123 For example, every person with a subprime mortgage signed the
disclosure statements mandated by the Truth in Lending Act.124
Alternatively, if the goal of disclosure is to provide more complete
information that then allows recipients of that information to adjust their conduct,
the efficacy of disclosure depends on two other assumptions.125 The first
assumption is that recipients are able to understand the disclosed information and
its implications.126 But often the information is so complex that we cannot assume
people can derive meaning from it.127
The second assumption required for this theory of disclosure to work is
that recipients can adjust their conduct to respond appropriately to the
information.128 Yet, often options for response do not exist or are unclear. For
example, it is clear enough that diners can avoid eating at a restaurant with a low
sanitary score, but it is less clear how recipients are to respond to the disclosure of
the fact that their doctor received gifts from particular pharmaceutical
companies.129
Finally, disclosure requirements are only effective if they are consistently
enforced.130 And assuming disclosure requirements are consistently enforced may
not be warranted.

121.
See Floyd Norris, Which Bosses Really Care if Shares Rise?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2006, at C1 (stating that many hope that “full disclosure will shame corporate
boards and bosses into cutting back on excessive pay”).
122.
See Chuck Collins, Disclosure Alone Won’t Stop Runaway CEO Pay,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 13, 2007, at A13; Daniel Akst, Why Rules Can’t Stop
Executive Greed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/
business/yourmoney/05cont.html?_r=0.
123.
Rosenthal, supra note 117 (“If recent history serves as a guide, disclosure
laws . . . do not necessarily . . . prevent the things they were meant to deter.”).
124.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5, 226.17 (2013).
125.
See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 3 (“For disclosure to be effective, the
recipient of advice must understand how the conflict of interest has influenced the advisor
and must be able to correct for that biasing influence.”); James Surowiecki, The Talking
Cure, NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2002, at 54.
126.
Cain et al., supra note 109, at 5.
127.
LESSIG, supra note 15, at 251–58 (providing a four-page list of contributions
to Congress and noting that while the information seems very important, its meaning is
unclear); Amitai Etzioni, Disclosure Is Not Enough, AMITAI ETZIONI NOTES (Sept. 24, 2008,
4:32 PM), http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/2008/09/disclosure-is-not-enough.html; see also
Brennan et al., supra note 96, at 431 (“[R]ecipients of information who are not experts in a
particular field often find it impossible to identify a biased opinion that they read or hear
about that subject.”).
128.
Cain et al., supra note 109, at 3–4.
129.
See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 96, at 431.
130.
See Etzioni, supra note 127.
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More startling is the news that disclosure is not only ineffective but may
be affirmatively harmful. Disclosure may first harm recipients of the information.
Recipients of information struggle with “unlearning, ignoring, or suppressing the
use of knowledge (such as biased advice) even if they are aware that it is
inaccurate.”131 Moreover, research suggests that disclosure increases rather than
decreases the information recipients trust in the discloser because the recipients
view the disclosers as more credible agents.132 Thus, disclosure perversely leads
recipients to rely on disclosers more rather than less.133
Another type of harm caused by compelled disclosure is the impact on the
persons disclosing the information.134 Disclosure is dangerous here in many ways.
First, disclosure allows persons disclosing to feel freer to engage in underlying
pernicious conduct. Disclosers feel less personally responsible once their conduct
is disclosed. This impact is sometime called “moral licensing.”135 After disclosure,
acting on the conflict seems like fair play; disclosure reduces guilty feelings for
engaging in conflict-inducing conduct.136 Along the same lines, persons disclosing
may even feel a sly pride, surmising that the compelled disclosure is evidence that
they are players.137
Second, the impact of disclosure on persons disclosing is harmful because
disclosure operates as an attractive risk-management strategy that allows them to
reduce their legal liability while continuing the underlying conduct.138 The impact
of disclosure on the persons disclosing is also harmful because it fuels
competition. Here, the best example is executive compensation, where required
disclosure has led to a race in compensation and perks.139 As Warren E. Buffett,

131.
Cain et al., supra note 109, at 6.
132.
Id. at 5–6.
133.
See id.; Paul Sullivan, In Investing, Disclosure Only Gets You So Far, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at F6; Surowiecki, supra note 125, at 54.
134.
See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 6–7.
135.
Id. at 7.
136.
Rosenthal, supra note 117 (“Indeed, disclosure has taken on the gestalt of
confession: Dump the information and be absolved of further moral or legal
responsibility.”).
137.
Chuck Collins of the Institute for Policy Studies suggests that chief executive
officers actually like public disclosure of their compensation. Collins asks, “Would you
discipline an exhibitionist by making them disrobe in the town square?” See Collins, supra
note 122.
138.
See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 18; Rosenthal, supra note 117 (“Often the
goal of disclosure is to reduce or eliminate the legal risk . . . . It is so [disclosers] can say,
‘Hey, we told you so.’” (quoting Dr. Kevin Weinfurt, Professor of Psychiatry, Duke
Univ.)).
139.
See Akst, supra note 122; Joseph Nocera, Disclosure Won’t Tame C.E.O.
Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, at C1 (stating that if the SEC requires fuller disclosure of
executive compensation because “whenever [C.E.O.s] discover a fellow C.E.O. is getting
something they don’t have, they make a grab for it. In other words, as laudable as more
disclosure is, there is a real possibility that it will make a bad situation worse.”); Norris,
surpa note 121; cf. Ginia Bellafante, Did You Give the Doorman Enough?, N.Y. TIMES,

2013]

FEDERAL CRIME OF GRATUITIES

439

the chief executive of Berkshire Hathaway, explains, “[t]he unintended
consequence [of disclosure] could be that it becomes a shopping list for
C.E.O.’s. . . . Of the seven deadly sins, the one that seems to work more than greed
is envy.”140
Finally, disclosure is harmful to society. It has a band-aid-like masking
effect and so allows society to feel that it is dealing with the danger presented by
the disclosed conduct. This relieves pressure to take effective action. In other
words, disclosure allows the status quo to continue and reduces pressure to make
more important institutional changes.141 Disclosure is also dangerous for society
because it makes the underlying conduct reported seem fine and normal. As other
authors have more eloquently put it, disclosure can “legitimize,”142 “normalize,”143
and “sanitize”144 undesirable conduct. If disclosure does not entirely normalize the
conduct, it surely trivializes the conduct. In sum, disclosure alone, without
prohibition, is not positive or even benign but is affirmatively harmful.
When the compelled-disclosure approach is examined specifically in the
context of gifting, the inadequacies and positive harms of disclosure are evident.
Current law requires disclosure of some gifts made to officials of the executive,145
legislative,146 and judicial branches.147 An assumption of this approach is that
recipients of the disclosed information (the public) on gifts would likely have the
ability to understand it, at least on a basic level. This information will not be as
complex as, for example, data on corporate finance. The public may not

Dec. 25, 2011, at MB1 (examining how people evaluate their conduct by comparison to
others’ conduct in tipping doormen at the holidays).
140.
See Norris, surpa note 121 (quoting Warren E. Buffett, chief executive of
Berkshire Hathaway).
141.
See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 3; Rosenthal, supra note 117; Surowiecki,
supra note 125, at 54.
142.
KRISTEN M. LORD, THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF GLOBAL TRANSPARENCY:
WHY THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION MAY NOT LEAD TO SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, OR PEACE
3 (2006).
143.
LESSIG, supra note 15, at 257–58; see also Weeks, supra, note 22, at 143
(stating that disclosure of campaign contributions to Congress was ineffective and “may
well have simply institutionalized the quid pro quo as the normal and, at least by
implication, the accepted manner by which legislation is enacted”); Rosenthal, supra note
117.
144.
See Brennan et al., supra note 96, at 431.
145.
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 102(a)(2)(A) (2012); 5
C.F.R. § 2634.304 (2013).
146.
5 U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101–111 (2012), also adopted as THE STANDING RULES OF
THE SENATE, SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, Rs. XXXIV, XLI(1) (2012), available at
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome.
147.
GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 620.50, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02C-Ch06.pdf (“Disclosure
Requirements: Judicial officers and employees subject to the Ethics in Government Act of
1978 and the instructions of the Financial Disclosure Committee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States must comply with the Act and the instructions in disclosing gifts.”).
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understand all the more subtle implications of the information, but they will
probably not be overcome by complexity.148 This assumption likely holds true.
The second assumption, that recipients can adjust their conduct to
respond to the information, is more of a problem. In the case of unelected public
officials, it is unclear how recipients can adjust conduct once gifting information is
disclosed. For example, how are we to respond to the disclosure of gifts received
by Supreme Court Justices?149 And even if recipients have a way to respond to the
gifting information, as noted above, research demonstrates that people have trouble
adjusting their conduct appropriately.150 Based in part on this research, the medical
education field has concluded that disclosure of gifts to physicians from medical
device companies is ineffective and has proposed instead that all gifts to
physicians from medical device companies be prohibited.151
Disclosure exacerbates the underlying problem in the context of gifting.
One example is provided by Senator Saxby Chambliss.152 When the Senate was
considering limiting lawmakers’ use of corporate jets in 2006, Senator Chambliss
opposed the limits. Rather than limit the conduct, he said, the simple answer was
to require disclosure of corporate jet use.153 The reason he took this position then
became clear: Senator Chambliss used corporate jets more than most other
senators.154 His support of the disclosure approach illustrates harmful aspects of
requiring disclosure. Disclosers feel less guilty and freed up to continue the
practice, and society imagines that the problem has been handled so no further
change to the status quo is necessary.155 Treating the conduct with disclosure
avoids more aversive action, like prohibition.
Another example of the positive harm caused by compelled disclosure of
gifts is revealed by a prosecutor’s remarks on the prosecution of Senator Ted
Stevens. Senator Stevens was prosecuted and found guilty on seven counts of lying

148.
See Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Justice Thomas Reports Wealth
of Gifts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at A1 (recounting gifts received and reported by Justice
Clarence Thomas between 1998 and 2003, including a $19,000 Bible from a Republican
donor, $15,000 for a Lincoln bust from the American Enterprise Institute, $5,000 in cash
from a mobile home enthusiast, $1,200 in tires from a trucking executive, $1,200 in
batteries from former law clerks, and an $800 jacket from the Daytona 500 auto race).
149.
See id.
150.
Cain et al., supra note 109, at 5–6.
151.
Brennan et al., supra note 96, at 431 (proposing that academic medical
centers prohibit all gifts from drug and medical device companies to physicians).
152.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Fight Looms on Lawmakers’ Use of Corporate Jets,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A19.
153.
Id.
154.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Fight Looms on Lawmakers’ Use of Corporate Jets,
N.Y. TIMES (March 8, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/
08/08lobby.html (issuing a March 13, 2006 amendment to the March 8, 2006 article stating
that: Senator Chambliss ranked third among current senators who from 2001 to 2005
reimbursed companies for jet travel).
155.
See supra notes 122–23, 135–38, 141–44 and accompanying text.
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to the government for not reporting the value of gifts on a disclosure form.156
Because of government errors, this verdict was set aside and no judgment of
conviction was entered.157 A prosecutor later characterized the case as “piddly,”
not one of the “crimes of the century. . . . It was a forms case—a guy got his
financial disclosure forms wrong.”158 Thus, the treatment of gifting as a target for
disclosure trivialized the danger of the underlying gifting conduct.
2. Gifting Because of Position is Not Currently Prohibited
a. Ethics Rules
Under current law, gifts to public officials are regulated by various ethics
laws. This is the regulatory structure the Court referred to in Sun-Diamond.159 As
Kathleen Clark has noted, this regulatory structure is complicated; it includes
statutes, regulations, and executive orders, and the laws are so complex that a
cottage industry has developed around them.160 These rules begin with a statute,
§ 7353, that generally prohibits gifts to all federal employees from certain
interested donors.161 The statute then authorizes each branch of government to
issue regulations establishing exceptions.162 The executive, legislative, and judicial
branches have all adopted their own regulations that prohibit or authorize gifts in
various circumstances.163 Within the executive branch, the maze of regulations is
even more convoluted because each agency has adopted its own set of
regulations.164 Aside from these rules based on § 7353, Congress has adopted

156.
Senator Stevens was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)–(2). In re:
Contempt Finding in United States v. Stevens, William M. Welch and Brenda K. Morris,
Appellants, United States v. Stevens, 663 F.3d 1270, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-5372),
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24431, at *2.
157.
The verdict was set aside because the government violated the Constitution
in failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. Id.
158.
Charlie Savage, Elite Unit’s Problems Pose Test for Attorney General, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A20 (quoting a former federal prosecutor with the public integrity
unit).
159.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 409–10
(1999).
160.
Clark, supra note 15, at 64–67.
161.
5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2012).
162.
Id. § 7353(b)(1).
163.
See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.201–.205 (2013) (regulating the executive branch); THE
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, R. XXXV (2012)
(regulating Senators and Senate employees); THE RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE RULES MANUAL, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, R. XXV (2012)
(regulating Representatives and House employees); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY Canon 4D4
§ 620 (regulating federal judges).
164.
See Agency Supplemental Regulations, U.S. OFF. GOV’T ETHICS,
http://www.oge.gov/Laws-and-Regulations/Agency-Supplemental-Regulations/Agency-Sup
plemental-Regulations/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (listing 48 sets of supplemental agency
regulations found in various parts of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
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several miscellaneous statutes.165 And on top of these statutes, in 2007, in the wake
of the Abramoff scandal, Congress adopted other statutes that prohibit certain
gifts.166
These ethics laws do not prohibit gifts from all donors to all public
officials because of their official positions. As Professor Clark points out, in the
main statute, all donees are covered but only certain categories of donors are
covered.167 This approach of applying the prohibition based on the identity of the
donor is called the prohibited source approach.168 Another statute also prohibits
gifts but only from donors who are foreign governments.169 Two additional statutes
prohibit gifts based on the particular type of donees, specifically government
employees involved in the procurement process170 and meat inspectors.171 The
most recently adopted statute, from 2007, prohibits gifts only from particular
donors (registered lobbyists) to particular public officials (persons in the legislative
branch).172 This statute limits the prohibition on gifts using both the prohibited
source and prohibited donee approaches.
These ethics prohibitions are pieces of a puzzle that do not cover all gifts
that donors give to donees because of the officials’ positions.173 The morass of
ethics rules is so difficult to understand, the law is almost unknowable, and the
patchwork character of the law leads to overlaps and gaps174 and other curious
features.175

165.
See Clark, supra note 15, at 83 n.133, 84 nn.135 & 139 (citing 5
U.S.C. § 7342 (2012); 41 U.S.C. § 423(p)(3)(A) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 622 (2012)).
166.
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1613 (2012).
167.
See Clark, supra note 15, at 82–83 (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 7353(a)(1)–(2)
(2012)).
168.
E.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 411
(quoting 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(d)(4) (1999) as forbidding gifts from a “prohibited source”).
169.
5 U.S.C. § 7342.
170.
41 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2012).
171.
21 U.S.C. § 622 (2012).
172.
2 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1613 (2012).
173.
See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(a)(2) (2013) (prohibiting federal employees in the
executive branch from soliciting or accepting a gift “[g]iven because of the employee’s
official position”). The Supreme Court described this provision as one that “makes unlawful
approximately (if not precisely)” the gifts the government argued for (and lost on) in SunDiamond, 526 U.S. at 411. The regulations, however, after stating this general rule, go on to
establish many qualifications and exceptions. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203 (2013) (“Definitions”);
Id. § 2635.204 (2013) (“Exceptions”).
174.
See generally Clark, supra note 15, at 80–84 (identifying various
redundancies and gaps in the ethics rules).
175.
The most curious feature is an executive branch regulation stating:
“Relationship to illegal gratuities statute. Unless accepted in violation of paragraph (c)(1) of
this section, a gift accepted under the standards set forth in this subpart shall not constitute
an illegal gratuity otherwise prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 201(c)(1)(B).” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(b).
As the Court noted in Sun-Diamond, “We are unaware of any law empowering [the Office
of Government Ethics] to decriminalize acts prohibited by Title 18 of the United States
Code.” 526 U.S. at 411.
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At any rate, if the ethics rules do cover a particular kind of gifting, that
coverage is not a persuasive reason to forego criminalizing that conduct. Ethics
prohibitions do not make criminal prohibitions unnecessary. In view of how likely
it is that such gifts will influence the public official and lead to bias, these ethics
prohibitions alone are not adequate. Criminal prohibitions are warranted; Congress
should make such gifts a crime. Richard E. Myers II has persuasively argued that
using excessive numbers of detailed regulations for punishment is an undesirable
approach to controlling conduct and that we should rather rely on crimes to “map
our moral intuitions.”176 Gifts to public officials because of their positions should
be controlled by amending the gratuity statute to criminalize them.
b. Criminal Law
The most recently adopted statute, from 2007, prohibits gifts only from
particular donors (registered lobbyists) to particular public officials (persons in the
legislative branch).177 These statutes limit the prohibition on gifts using both the
prohibited source and prohibited donee approaches.178
If disclosure is required by ethics laws, lying or failing to disclose may be
treated as a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1001—a federal criminal statute that prohibits
lying to and failing to disclose information to the government.179 In 2011, two
high-profile prosecutions of public officials, who received things of value from
private donors because of their official positions, ended. The defendants were
Senator Ted Stevens180 and David Safavian.181 Senator Stevens received gifts
including approximately $250,000 worth of goods and services to upgrade his
house in Alaska.182 David Safavian, who was at the time Chief of Staff for the
Administrator of the Government Services Administration, received a golf junket
to Scotland and England,183 which included, inter alia: a private charter flight,184
golf fees costing more than $300 per round,185 and hotel rooms at around $500 per
night.186
These two public officials were prosecuted not for receiving gifts because
of their positions, but for lying about them to the government. Senator Stevens was
found guilty by a jury on seven counts of making a false statement to the

176.
Myers, supra note 11, at 1872–73.
177.
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1613.
178.
See id.
179.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2012).
180.
See In re Contempt Finding in United States v. Stevens, 663 F.3d 1270, 1271
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
181.
See United States v. Safavian, 649 F.3d 688, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
182.
Neil A. Lewis, Dismissal for Stevens, but Question on ‘Innocent,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14.
183.
United States v. Safavian, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 649
F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
184.
Id. at 4, 21.
185.
Id. at 22.
186.
Id. at 23.
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government, although the verdict was later set aside.187 David Safavian was found
guilty by a jury on four counts of lying to the government;188 his convictions were
affirmed.189
In both Stevens and Safavian, the defendants’ conduct underlying the
false statements involved receiving things of value for or because of their official
position. But they were not prosecuted for that, likely because the Sun-Diamond
interpretation of the gratuities statute made that theory of prosecution unavailable.
Instead, the defendants were prosecuted for lying to government about the things
of value they received.
This approach has drawbacks. These two pieces of conduct, receiving
gifts because of an official position and lying to the government, are distinct pieces
of criminal conduct with distinct harms. If defendants did both, they should face
liability for both.
Moreover, prosecuting public officials for lying to the government but not
for underlying conduct that led to the lies diminishes the legitimacy and credibility
of federal criminal law. These cases were pretextual prosecutions to the extent that
the defendants were suspected of committing a crime and were investigated based
on some conduct (accepting the things of value) and then prosecuted based on
unrelated conduct (lying to the government).190 This has been dubbed the Al
Capone approach to criminal prosecution.191 Daniel Richman and William Stuntz
have identified the government argument in support of the Al Capone approach192
and chronicled how this argument wins in courts and is tolerated in the academic
literature.193 Professors Richman and Stuntz criticize this approach because it
muddies the signals a criminal prosecution sends to society, and the justice system
loses credibility when the charges that motivate a prosecution do not coincide with
187.
Senator Stevens was found guilty by a jury on seven counts of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 for not reporting the value of gifts on a campaign disclosure form. See In re
Contempt Finding in United States v. Stevens, 663 F.3d 1270, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Lewis, supra note 182 (stating that Mr. Stevens was convicted on seven counts). The verdict
was set aside because the government violated the Constitution in failing to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense. See United States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231(EGS),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39046, at *1–2 (D.D.C. April 7, 2009).
188.
Safavian, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 7. The four counts included three counts of
making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) (2012) and one count of obstruction
of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012). Id.
189.
United States v. Safavian, 649 F.3d 688, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
190.
See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay
on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 584–85
(2005).
191.
See Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1182 (2004);
Richman & Stuntz, supra note 190, at 584–85.
192.
Richman & Stuntz, supra note 190, at 584 (“The government responds
that . . . false statements . . . or whatever the charged offense . . . is a legitimate crime,
something for which any ordinary citizen might be prosecuted and punished if guilty. Surely
the Al Capones of the world should not be immune from punishment for the small crimes
they commit by virtue of their larger crimes.”).
193.
Id. at 584–85.
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the charges on which defendants are convicted.194 That is exactly the situation here
in using false statements to the government as the basis for prosecution instead of
using the gratuities conduct. This approach to prosecution is not healthy for federal
criminal law.195
3. Gifting Because of Position Should Be Prohibited as a Crime by Amending the
Gratuity Statute to Cover It
Influence research indicates that when donors transfer value to donees
because of the public officials’ positions, the public officials will be influenced to
reciprocate.196 Controlling such gifts through disclosure alone is not an adequate
response, and ethics rules and current criminal laws do not prohibit this conduct
comprehensively and clearly. Congress should amend the gratuities statute to
prohibit gifting to public officials because of their positions. Before going ahead
with the specifics, however, we need to address the dangers of overcriminalization.
D. Possible Limits to Avoid Overcriminalization
One possible critique of my proposal to criminalize gifts based on an
official’s position is that it may overcriminalize the behavior. The drawbacks of
overcriminalization in the context of gratuities have been well articulated by
George Brown.197 They include concerns about vagueness, prosecutorial
discretion, criminalization of ethics rules, and criminalization of innocent
conduct.198 Other commentators have recognized the legitimate dangers of
overcriminalization in general.199 These concerns must be addressed if the
gratuities crime is expanded.
1. Ways to Avoid Overcriminalization: Possible Solutions
Several methods to limit the gratuities crime to avoid overcriminalization
have been suggested or adopted. One is to limit the crime to certain types of
donors or donees. An example of this approach is the criminal statute adopted after
the Abramoff scandal in 2007 that prohibits gifts from registered lobbyists to
certain officials in the executive branch.200 Professor Brown, who endorses
expanding the crime of gratuities, has explored this approach to criminalizing
gratuities.201 The downside of this method of limiting the crime is that it
194.
Id. at 586–87.
195.
See Myers, supra note 11, at 1855, 1864 (stating that crime is not an
appropriate subject for elite and expert views but instead should reflect broadly held moral
commitments). But see Litman, supra note 191, at 1182 (arguing that objections in principle
to the Al Capone approach fail; that the approach in actual practice is generally justified;
and that the considerations driving the approach are legitimate and sensible).
196.
See supra Part V.B.
197.
Brown, supra note 11, at 1372.
198.
See id. at 1387–94.
199.
Myers, supra note 11, at 1865–66.
200.
See Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 1606, 1613 (2012).
201.
See Brown, supra note 11, at 1413.
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constitutes a piecemeal approach to the problem that is not broad enough to handle
all the dangers of gifting.
A second approach to limit the dangers of overcriminalization is to
include in the statute some minimum amount of value that the thing given to the
public official must reach. For example, the statute could prohibit gifts to public
officials because of their positions with a value over $50 or $100. Federal criminal
law has occasionally used this approach to set floors for what constitutes criminal
behavior.202 This is not the best limiting technique for gratuities because, as
discussed above, influence research shows that even small gifts can trigger the
urge to reciprocate.203
An unusual approach to limiting the crime is evidenced in a 2011 bill that
was before the Senate.204 This bill proposed to reverse the Sun-Diamond result—
that gifts based on an official’s position are not criminal—and extend the gratuities
crime to cover all benefits given to public officials because of their position.205 The
bill’s proposal was consistent with the proposal in this Article. However, the
Senate’s bill went on to carve out from the amended crime all gifts given or
accepted in conformity with the ethics rules.206 In effect, this was a safe harbor
from criminal liability based on the complex ethics rules and regulations discussed
above.207 This definition of the crime as depending on whether the defendant
complied with the ethics rules has the drawback of making the criminal liability
line impossible to understand.208 This is not the best approach for criminal law,
which should strive for clarity in charting society’s broad moral conclusions.209
2. My Solution: Limit the Crime the Old-Fashioned Way, with a Mens Rea
Element
The best way to limit the law to avoid overcriminalization is for Congress
to add mens rea terms to the statute.210 This is the criminal law’s traditional way of
avoiding overcriminalization. Before proposing a particular mens rea for
gratuities, this Article examines what the mens rea is now. Nowhere have courts or
commentators provided a comprehensive analysis of the mens rea for the crime of
gratuities.

202.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
203.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
204.
See Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401, 112th Cong.
(as introduced in the Senate, Feb. 17, 2011). The Senate did not take action and the
proposed 2011 bill died.
205.
Id. § 12.
206.
Id. § 12(a)(4).
207.
PATRICK LEAHY, PROPOSED PUBLIC CORRUPTION PROSECUTION
IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-239, at 6 (2007) (characterizing the carve-out
as a “safe harbor”).
208.
See Clark, supra note 15, at 64–67.
209.
See Myers, supra note 11, at 1864, 1867, 1877–78.
210.
See id. at 1873–74.
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a. The Mens Rea Currently
The mens rea for gratuities is not easily defined. The statute has no mens
rea term,211 but Congress sometimes writes empty criminal statutes and leaves the
mens rea to the courts.212 The Supreme Court holds that the requirement of mens
rea is a background presumption, and the courts will generally infer mens rea
when the statute is empty to avoid strict liability crimes.213 The following Subpart
starts with cases from the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Circuit,
then looks at the cases from other circuits decided after Sun-Diamond, and finally
examines cases from other circuits decided before Sun-Diamond.
i. The Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit
The Supreme Court has considered the crime twice. Both of these cases
arose in the D.C. Circuit and are best understood against the background of all the
D.C. Circuit’s gratuities case law. The D.C. Circuit case law is also important on
its own because it is where most gratuities cases arise.214
In the first Supreme Court case, United States v. Brewster, the defendant
donee was a former U.S. Senator. 215 He was indicted on four counts of bribery and
one count of gratuities for soliciting and taking money in return for his actions on
postal rate legislation when he was in the Senate.216 The defendant moved to
dismiss the indictment because the prosecution would require examination of his
legislative behavior and would run afoul of the Speech or Debate Clause.217
Although the Speech and Debate Clause protects legislators from investigations
regarding their official business, the Supreme Court held in 1972 that the
prosecution could proceed because taking bribes is not part of the legislative
211.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). This statute omits any of the usual mens
rea terms like purposefully, intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, negligently, willfully, or
corruptly. Id.
212.
See, e.g., Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) (showing that the firearms crime
includes no mens rea in the statute, but courts have imposed a mes rea of “knowingly”);
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (showing that although the Hobbs Act includes no
mens rea in the statute, courts have read in a mens rea element). Recently, Justice Scalia
described and criticized Congress’s approach to drafting criminal statutes:
We face a Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of laws in
general, and of criminal laws in particular. It should be no surprise that
as the volume increases, so do the number of imprecise laws. . . . Fuzzy,
leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation is attractive
to the Congressman who wants credit for addressing a national problem
but does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the
nitty-gritty. In the field of criminal law, at least, it is time to call a halt.
Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213.
See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 & n.3 (1994); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–56 (1952).
214.
See generally Eliason, supra note 22.
215.
408 U.S. 501, 502 (1972).
216.
Id.
217.
Id. at 503.
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process.218 Most of the decision focused on the bribery counts, but in one
paragraph addressing the gratuity count, the Court stated:
[I]t is, once again, unnecessary to inquire into the [defendant’s] act or its
motivation. To sustain a conviction it is necessary to show that
[defendant] solicited, received, or agreed to receive, money with
knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for an official
act. Inquiry into the legislative performance itself is not necessary;
evidence of the [defendant’s] knowledge of the alleged briber’s illicit
reasons for paying the money is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.219

This language means that to be liable for gratuities, a donee must have knowledge
that the donor gave him the gift for or because of an official act; in other words,
the donee must have a mens rea of knowledge of the facts.220
After the Supreme Court held that the Brewster prosecution could
continue,221 the defendant went to trial.222 The jury instructions stated that the
defendant official had to have received the gifts “willfully and knowingly rather
than by mistake or accident,” and further stated that the government did not have
to prove “any corrupt intent.”223 The defendant was convicted on three counts of
gratuities. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found these instructions to be in error and
reversed the convictions because the instructions did not clearly distinguish among
bribery, gratuity, and no crime with indisputable clarity.224
This case does not further the mens rea analysis. The D.C. Circuit first
quotes the Supreme Court language reprinted above stating that for a gratuities
conviction, the donee must have knowledge that the gift was for or because of an
official act.225 But the circuit court then holds that a gratuities conviction based on
instructions requiring the defendant to act “willfully and knowingly” was error for
other reasons.226 The court also makes a number of curious random statements
about mens rea. The court identifies the “otherwise clause” of the statute as the

218.
Id. at 525–26.
219.
Id. at 527.
220.
The strength of Brewster is undermined somewhat because mens rea was not
the main issue; moreover, throughout the decision, the Court focused on the crime of
bribery and often discussed the crimes of bribery and gratuities without distinguishing them.
See, e.g., id. at 502 (“This direct appeal from the District Court presents the question
whether a Member of Congress may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), 201(g),
for accepting a bribe in exchange for a promise relating to an official act.”). The Court also
stated that “[t]he counts of the indictment involved in the instant case were based on 18
U.S.C. § 201, a bribery statute . . . . Subsections (c)(1) and (g) prohibit the accepting of a
bribe in return for being influenced in or performing an official act.” Id. at 505–06. When
this decision was handed down in 1972, the gratuities crime had already been codified in 18
U.S.C. § 201(g) (2012).
221.
Id. at 528–29.
222.
See generally United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
223.
Id. at 80.
224.
Id. at 67–68, 81–82.
225.
Id. at 76.
226.
Id. at 81–83.
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basis for mens rea.227 The court notes that “general criminal intent” is required.228
After noting that a donee must have knowledge that the donor gave the gift for or
because of an official act, the court recharacterizes this as “a certain guilty
knowledge.”229 Overall, the court’s statements and holding are curious and
inconsistent.
In 1982, in United States v. Campbell, the D.C. Circuit handed down an
opinion that not only failed to clarify the mens rea for gratuities but affirmatively
injected new confusion.230 The government charged a trucking company and a
judge of the D.C. Superior Court with various political corruption crimes, and the
jury convicted each defendant on one count of gratuities.231 The gratuities count
charged that the construction company, which had received hundreds of tickets for
weight violations, gave the judge adjudicating the tickets help with moving his
household goods.232 Three times the D.C. Circuit describes the jury instructions as
requiring that defendants have a mens rea of “knowingly and willfully.”233 But the
problem is that in concluding the discussion, the Court affirms the convictions and
announces, “[i]t was more than sufficient in this case for the trial court to require
that the alleged gratuities be given and received ‘knowingly and willingly’ and ‘for
or because of an official act.’”234 In this statement, the court used the word
“willingly” rather than the word “willfully.”
The court did not offer any explanation or authority, so it is unclear what
to make of this change in words. The switch might not have mattered, but
“willingly” is the term that subsequent decisions picked up and wove into the
gratuities law of the D.C. Circuit.235 Likely, the switch in words was a typo. The
word “willingly” is generally not used in federal criminal law and has no
established meaning.236 Congress has not used the term in any regularly prosecuted
criminal statute.237 Aside from the gratuities cases in the D.C. Circuit, the term
“willingly” has shown up in the case law only rarely,238 and in all the cases it was
227.
Id. at 71.
228.
Id. at 82.
229.
Id.
230.
See 684 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
231.
Id. at 144–45.
232.
Id. at 144.
233.
See id. at 147–48.
234.
Id. at 150.
235.
See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 965–
67 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999); United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511,
1522 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 149–50 (D.C. Cir.
1982)).
236.
See infra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
237.
I know of no statute where the term was used, but because there are at least
4,000 federal crimes spread throughout many titles, I cannot say Congress has never used it.
See generally John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime
Legislation, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/
measuring-the-explosive-growth-of-federal-crime-legislation.
238.
See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 174 (3d Cir. 2008); United
States v. Dearing, 504 F.3d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383,
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likely a mistake.239 Outside case law, the term “willingly” sometimes turns up, but
in all these sources, when the authority is checked, the writer merely substituted
the word “willingly” for “willfully.”240
Thus, after using the term willfully three times, the D.C. Circuit just made
a mistake in substituting the term willingly for willfully in the one sentence at the
end of its opinion. The D.C. Circuit’s introduction of the term willingly in
Campbell and its use in succeeding cases does not illuminate but confuses the
mens rea for gratuities.241
The second time the Supreme Court considered the crime of gratuities
was in 1999 in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California.242 The
defendant was a trade association for growers of raisins, figs, walnuts, prunes, and
hazelnuts. It was charged with gratuities for giving gifts to the Secretary of
Agriculture, Mike Espy,243 including, tickets to the U.S. Open tennis tournament,
luggage, meals, a framed print, and a crystal bowl.244 The defendant was convicted
397 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 100 (5th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Soriano, 880 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F.
Supp. 335, 348 n.14 (D.D.C. 1997).
239.
In Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 174, the court states that the district court gave an
instruction on “willingly,” but later in the case, the circuit court states at least five times that
the instructions used the term “willfully” and quotes the instructions using that word. See id.
at 177, 181–82. In Osborne, 68 F.3d at 100 n.18, the authority the court cites for “willingly”
is 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012) and United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 910 (5th Cir.
1992), but both of those sources use the term “willfully.” In two of the cases, the court’s
main instruction used the word “willingly,” but the court defined the term “willfully.” See
Dearing, 504 F.3d at 902; George, 386 F.3d at 397. In Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. at
348 n.14, the court uses the word “willingly” for the aiding and abetting statute, which uses
the term “willfully.” Finally, in Soriano, 880 F.2d at 198, the court states that the indictment
uses “willingly” when an earlier quote of the indictment shows it used the term “willfully.”
240.
See, e.g., 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 19:02 (6th ed. 2008) (stating that in Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1
(2006), the issue was whether the defendant acted “willingly,” but the term used in both the
statute (18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012)) and the case is “willfully”); 2B KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET
AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 61.05 (5th ed. 2000) (stating that in
United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980), the issue was whether defendants
“willingly” transported Cuban nationals, but the term used in both the statute (18 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (2012)) and the case was “willfully”).
241.
In addition, reconciling the D.C. Circuit’s conclusions in United States v.
Campbell, 684 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), is not easy. In 1974, the Brewster court concluded that instructions requiring the
defendant to have a mens rea element of willfully and knowingly were error because of a
blurry tripartite distinction. See 506 F.2d at 78–81. But in Campbell in 1982, instructions
that required the defendant to have a mens rea element of knowingly and willfully/willingly
were deemed more than sufficient to meet the plain error standard. See 684 F.2d at 150.
242.
526 U.S. 398 (1999).
243.
Id. at 400–01.
244.
Id. at 401. The indictment had two gratuities counts. Count I alleged that
Sun-Diamond gave Secretary of Agriculture Espy tickets to the 1993 U.S. Open Tennis
Tournament worth $2,295, luggage worth $2,427, meals worth $665, and a framed print and
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at trial, but the D.C. Circuit reversed because the instructions allowed the jury to
convict Sun-Diamond based on gifts given because of the official’s position rather
than the gifts being linked a particular act. The government appealed, and the
Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit: The government could not convict
the defendant donor for gratuities based on giving things to a public official
because of the official’s position but rather had to prove that the donor’s gifts were
tied to a particular official act.245
On mens rea, the jury instructions required the defendant to give the gifts
to the federal official “knowingly and willingly.”246 The Supreme Court does not
discuss these mens rea terms because it finds the instructions erroneous on other
grounds, i.e., their reference to the donee’s official position rather than to a
particular official act.247 In the course of the opinion, the Court makes one
comment that arguably refers to the mens rea for gratuities. The Court states that
the main difference between the crime of bribery and gratuities is the “intent
element”: Bribery requires an intent to influence the public official whereas the
gratuities crime “requires only that the gratuity be given . . . ‘for or because of’ an
official act.”248 This statement is surely correct, but it does not tell us anything
about mens rea—about whether the donor and donee must intend that the gift be
because of an official act, or know that the gift is because of an official act, or
know that gifting because of an official act is illegal. Reading the decision to
establish anything about the mens rea for the crime is a stretch. Between the two
Supreme Court cases, Brewster provides some guidance on the mens rea for the
crime (the donee must have knowledge of the facts—that is, knowledge that the
donor gave him the gift because of an official act) but Sun-Diamond does not.
In United States v. Schaffer, the D.C. Circuit decided the first case after
the Supreme Court narrowed the gratuities crime in Sun-Diamond.249 The
crystal bowl worth $524. See United States v. Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d 961, 964–65 (D.C.
Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999). Count II charged that Sun-Diamond paid $3,100 for
Secretary Espy’s girlfriend to accompany him to the International Nut Conference in
Athens, Greece. Id. at 965 n.1. The jury convicted on Count I and acquitted on Count II. See
id. at 965 n.1.
245.
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414 (affirming the D.C. Circuit’s judgment
reversing the conviction).
246.
Id. at 413. The district court’s instructions stated that the government must
prove that the defendant “knowingly and willingly” gave the gifts “at least in part” because
of the public official’s position. The court used the terms “knowingly and willingly” three
times in describing what the government must prove about the defendant’s conduct. See id.
247.
The Court’s characterization of the question in the case was narrow. The
Court stated, “[t]he point in controversy here is that the instructions went on to suggest that
§ 201(c)(1)(A), unlike the bribery statute, did not require any connection between
respondent’s intent and a specific official act.” Id. at 405. The Court’s statement of the
holding was also narrow. The Court concluded, “[w]e hold that, in order to establish a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the Government must prove a link between a thing of
value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it
was given.” Id. at 414. Thus the conviction was reversed.
248.
Id. at 404.
249.
183 F.3d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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defendant, an employee of Tyson Foods, was indicted for various political
corruption crimes, including two counts of gratuities for giving gifts to Secretary
of Agriculture Mike Espy. The instructions at trial were based in part on a theory
of accomplice liability and required the defendant donor to have a mens rea of
intent to participate in the crime and intent to make the crime succeed.250 The
defendant was convicted on one count of gratuities,251 but the trial court reversed
the conviction for insufficient evidence of intent to influence, and the D.C. Circuit
affirmed. 252
However, requiring evidence of intent to influence produces an
incoherent result. The Supreme Court pointed out in Sun-Diamond that while the
crime of bribery requires a mens rea of intent to influence, the crime of gratuities
does not.253 That difference in mens rea is one of the main distinguishing factors
between the crimes of gratuities and bribery. The Schaffer opinion is a thorough
garble of mens reas for gratuities and bribery and does not advance the cause of
defining the mens rea for gratuities. Furthermore, as the first opinion discussing
the gratuities crime after Sun-Diamond was decided, the court was not focused on
mens rea but on fleshing out the meaning of the new requirement of connection to
a particular official act.254 Rather than helping to define the mens rea for gratuities,
this case is the poster child for the confused line between the crimes of bribery and
gratuities.255
The D.C. Circuit has also articulated a mens rea for the crime of gratuities
in two other cases, but neither of these involved a gratuities prosecution, so the

250.
Id. at 842 n.10 (instructing that the government must prove the defendant
“intentionally participate[d] in the commission of a crime”; “knowingly associated himself
with the persons who committed the crime”; “intended . . . to make the crime succeed”; and,
“knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the principal offenders in committing the
crime”).
251.
The conviction was based on the defendant giving Espy four seats at the
inaugural dinner worth $6,000. See id. at 837, 842.
252.
Id. at 844. The court asks whether a rational jury could find the defendant
had “the requisite statutory intent to influence,” and then spends several paragraphs
explaining why the evidence of intent to influence was insufficient. Id. at 842–45.
253.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05
(1999); see 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). Other circuit courts had recognized this difference
in mens rea for some time. See, e.g., United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“We further note that the instruction Patel requested incorrectly states the law because it
required the jury to find that Patel gave [the public official] the gratuity in order to influence
him with respect to the hotel’s sale, which is not supported by the language in
§ 201(c)(1)(A).”).
254.
See Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 840 (stating that the trial court focused on proof of
the official act and “we focus our attention there as well”).
255.
In Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc),
the D.C. Circuit stated that unlike the anti-bribery provision, the anti-gratuity provision did
not require that the payment actually influence the performance of an official act. This helps
somewhat to clarify the confusion generated by Schaffer on the distinction between
gratuities and bribery, but it does not say anything about the mens rea required for the two
crimes, specifically whether an intent to influence is required as a mens rea for gratuities.
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language is dicta. In United States v. Gatling, the defendants were federal officials
in charge of allocating section 8 subsidized housing, and they were convicted, inter
alia, on one count of conspiracy to commit bribery.256 On appeal, they claimed the
evidence of bribery was insufficient and showed only the crime of gratuities.257
The court rejected this challenge, but in passing stated that the mens rea for
gratuities is “knowingly and willingly.”258 Repetition of the term “willingly,”
which was injected into the law by the D.C. Circuit’s typo in Brewster, is not
helpful in defining mens rea.
In its most recent case on gratuities, in 2010, the D.C. Circuit announced
in United States v. Project on Government Oversight (“POGO”) that the mens rea
for the gratuities crime was intent, and it did not further specify intent as to
what.259 The court based its conclusion that intent was a required element of the
crime on the Supreme Court’s Sun-Diamond opinion. According to the POGO
court, the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond defined the mens rea for gratuities as
being intentional.260 This finding was based on the statutory language requiring the
gift to be given “for or because of an official act.”261 This analysis is dubious on
many levels.
In POGO, the question was whether a civil action by the government for
monetary penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) required the defendant to have mens
rea.262 To reach its interpretation of § 209(a), the D.C. Circuit analogized its case
to Sun-Diamond, but this approach has a number of problems.263 The words in
question in the two statutes are not similar. In the gratuity crime, the words in
question were “for or because of an official act,” whereas the words in question in
POGO were “as compensation for” government work.264 Moreover, the D.C.
Circuit’s reading of Sun-Diamond as establishing a mens rea of intent is a stretch;
it depends on picking and choosing language carefully and combining quotes from
separate passages in Sun-Diamond into a single sentence.265 Finally, even
assuming the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond
established a mens rea of intent for the gratuities crime is persuasive, that
statement by the D.C. Circuit is dicta. The POGO case did not involve the
gratuities statute but a different statute, and one that was being applied in a civil

256.
96 F.3d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
257.
Id. at 1518.
258.
Id. at 1522 (citing United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 149–50 (D.C.
Cir. 1982)).
259.
616 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
260.
Id. at 554.
261.
The POGO court states: “[T]he Supreme Court has described that language
as containing an ‘intent element’ namely, a ‘connection between respondent’s intent and a
specific official act.’” Id. at 550 (citation omitted).
262.
Id. at 548.
263.
Id. at 554.
264.
Id. at 550.
265.
Id. at 550, 554.
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action rather than as a crime.266 Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s announcement that the
crime of gratuities has a mens rea of intent is dubious.
ii. Courts Outside the D.C. Circuit

aa. Cases Decided After Sun-Diamond
Courts of Appeals outside the D.C. Circuit have handed down few
decisions since Sun-Diamond was decided,267 and only three decisions mention
mens rea at all. In United States v. Hoffman, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a
gratuities conviction despite the defendant’s arguments that the instructions were
error and the proof insufficient.268 The defendant’s main argument was that the
gifts he gave to the public official were personal and had no connection to an
official act.269 On mens rea, the court first characterizes the elements instruction,
which did not include mens rea, as correct.270 This suggests that gratuities is a
strict liability crime. But later in the opinion, the court quotes a previous Eighth
Circuit case on the point that “the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intended to reward the [public official].”271 The court then
concludes without further elaboration that the instructions were not error and the
proof of the “requisite intent to reward” was sufficient.272 This decision is
internally inconsistent on whether mens rea is required.273
In United States v. McCarter, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit issued an
unpublished opinion in which it found the evidence of gratuities and bribery
sufficient.274 The court stated that although the defendant’s receipt of things of
value did not necessarily establish her “knowledge of illegal activities or requisite
intent to violate the law, . . . there was sufficient evidence of her knowledge and
intent to support her conviction.”275 The court uses the words knowledge and intent
but leaves unspecified knowledge of what and intent to do what. This decision also
has little value because it is unpublished, and it lumps bribery and gratuities

266.
POGO is a civil case where the decision was based on criminal law
principles. The statutes provided two ways for the government to enforce this standard:
through criminal prosecution or a civil action. In POGO, the government chose a civil
enforcement theory. But the court resolves the elements of the civil violation by referring to
the background principles of criminal law. The statutory language of the prohibition in
§ 209(a) was the same for both criminal and civil enforcement, but the relevance of the
criminal law principles in a civil enforcement case is not obvious.
267.
See Eliason, supra note 22, at 930 n.3.
268.
556 F.3d 871, 875, 878 (8th Cir. 2009).
269.
Id. at 874.
270.
Id. at 875.
271.
Id. at 876 (quoting United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir.
1994)).
272.
Id. at 877.
273.
The decision also includes a dissent arguing that the defendant’s mens rea
did not coincide with the conduct. See id. at 878–79 (Bye, J., dissenting,).
274.
219 F. App’x 921, 930 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
275.
Id.
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together in the discussion, making specific conclusions on the mens rea for
gratuities impossible.276
Finally, in United States v. Antico, the court discussed whether SunDiamond had any impact on the requirement of a quid pro quo in Hobbs Act
prosecutions and concluded it did not.277 In recounting the holding of SunDiamond, the court refers to the Supreme Court’s recognition of a required
connection between “the public official’s intent and a specific official act.”278 That
is the only reference to mens rea in Antico. The unexplained reference to intent is
not helpful, and at any rate, it is dicta because this is not a gratuities case. In sum,
these three decisions addressing mens rea, including one that is dicta and one that
is unpublished, are not good authority.

bb. Cases Decided Before Sun-Diamond
The case law from other circuits before Sun-Diamond is similarly not
helpful. Some cases recount the elements of gratuities without including any mens
rea factor.279 Sometimes the decisions are opaque: The courts merely announce a
conclusion on mens rea without explanation or authority.280 Sometimes the
opinions are internally inconsistent on mens rea.281

276.
See id.
277.
275 F.3d 245, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2001).
278.
Id. at 260.
279.
See United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 995 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating
that the gratuity statute requires only that the thing of value be either unlawfully given or
unlawfully accepted for the proper discharge of official duty).
280.
See United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir. 1994) (instructing a
jury that the government had to prove that defendant donor had intent to reward donee);
United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding evidence of
defendant’s intent sufficient without specifying intent to what).
281.
See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled
on other grounds by 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (stating several times that no mens rea was
required but then finding proof sufficient that defendant public official knew he was
receiving a gift of a loan guaranty); United States v. Previte, 648 F.2d 73, 82 (1st Cir. 1981)
(stating that defendant donee must have “guilty knowledge”; that he must have “the specific
intent to violate the substantive statute”; and that an instruction requiring the defendant to
act “knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully” was not plain error); United States v. Evans, 572
F.2d 455, 479, 480–82 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
In Evans, the Court found evidence sufficient for jury to infer defendant’s “guilty
knowledge.” Id. at 479. The Court also stated that statute makes it illegal for a public
official to accept a thing of value to which he is not lawfully entitled, “regardless of the
intent of the donor or donee”; however, the Court found evidence sufficient that defendant
accepted the things of value “knowingly and purposefully and not through accident,
misunderstanding, inadvertence or other innocent reasons.” Id. at 480–81. The Court wrote:
“The jury was well justified in concluding that Evans accepted the money and favors with
knowledge that the payments were made because of his official position.” Id. at 482. In
United States v. Irwin, the Court affirmed a conviction based on a jury instruction that
defendant must act willfully, knowingly, and intentionally, as distinguished from
inadvertently or negligently. 354 F.2d 192, 196–98 (2d Cir. 1965). The Court stated that
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Sometimes the case law is contradictory within a circuit.282 Sometimes
the authority does not exist as cited,283 and sometimes the cases mischaracterize
the statute.284 In some cases, the definition of the mens rea is clouded by the
presence of an aiding-and-abetting theory or a conspiracy charge.285 Sometimes the
courts garble the discussion of the mens rea for gratuities with the mens rea for
bribery.286 Sometimes the holding on mens rea is so intertwined with the SunDiamond issue (whether the government must prove a particular official act) that
besides the fact that the cases have been overruled on other grounds, the
conclusion on mens rea is called into question.287 Sometimes the mens rea
language is dicta.288 Sometimes the court is reviewing only for plain error.289 In

“for or because” language requires a “particular state of mind, design or purpose, which is
the essence of intent.” Id. at 197. The Court also stated that the government must prove that
the defendant committed the prohibited act “knowingly and purposefully and not through
accident, misunderstanding, inadvertence or other innocent reasons” and that iniquity of
procuring public officials is destructive “be it intentional or unintentional.” Id. at 196–97.
282.
Compare Irwin, 354 F.2d at 197–98 & n.3 (affirming conviction based on
jury instruction that defendant must act willfully, knowingly, and intentionally, as
distinguished from inadvertently or negligently), with United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d
725, 730 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that gratuities are criminal “regardless of the intent of either
payor or payee with respect to the payment”).
283.
See Umans, 368 F.2d at 730. Umans cites Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir.
1965), for the proposition that the gratuity statute makes it a crime when an official receives
a sum he is not entitled to receive “regardless of the intent of either payor or payee with
respect to the payment”; however, that proposition is not supported by the Irwin decision at
that cite. Id. The Irwin court states that the trial judge “fully and correctly” charged the jury
that the defendant must have acted willfully, knowingly and intentionally. Irwin, 354 F.2d at
197–98 & n.3.
284.
See Strand, 574 F.2d at 995 n.2 (stating that the gratuity subsections “require
only that the thing of value be given or accepted ‘otherwise than as provided by law for the
proper discharge of official duty,’” thereby omitting any reference to statutory language that
the thing of value be given or accepted for or because of an official act).
285.
See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 681 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that
evidence did not permit jury to find that defendant knew his father received stock as a bribe
or gratuity and without that knowledge, the defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting
the crime could not stand); Previte, 648 F.2d at 81–82 (holding that the instruction on
conspiracy to accept gratuity was not plain error).
286.
See United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming
two counts of conviction for gratuity but using bribery terms “in exchange for” and “quid
pro quo”); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that
evidence supported the gratuities conviction, but the donor knew that donee was in position
to affect conditions of confinement).
287.
See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 940–41 (5th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1080 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc); United States v.
Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 482 (5th Cir. 1978); Alessio, 528 F.2d at 1082. All four cases were
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526
U.S. 398 (1999).
See Strand, 574 F.2d at 995 n.2.
288.
289.
See Previte, 648 F.2d at 82 (holding that instruction was not plain error).
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one case, the opinion was unpublished.290 Reading the cases to determine the mens
rea for gratuities is an exercise in all the sources of ambiguity in common law
authority.
iii. Summary
This analysis of the case law demonstrates that the courts have failed to
develop a coherent theory of mens rea for the gratuities crime. To the extent that
the case law can be said to establish any mens rea, it is that defendants who are
donees must have knowledge of the facts. This conclusion is supported by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brewster.291 The Second Circuit corroborated this
conclusion in United States v. Biaggi.292 In Biaggi, the court reversed Richard
Biaggi’s gratuities conviction for aiding and abetting a donee (his father,
Congressman Biaggi) because the evidence was insufficient that defendant
Richard knew that shares of stock were given to his father as a bribe or a
gratuity.293 This case is fair authority for the proposition that a donee cannot be
convicted of gratuities without knowledge of the facts, although the clarity of the
holding on the mens rea is impaired somewhat by the presence of the aiding-andabetting theory of prosecution.294 Although we may discern this tiny nugget of
mens rea law from the cases, the overriding message is that the courts have not
defined a mens rea for gratuities.
b. The Proposed Mens Rea
In considering the best mens rea term to add to an expanded gratuities
statute, the first step is to recognize that the mens rea required for the donor and
the donee need not be the same. Courts have concluded that the liability of the
donor and public official is not interdependent and need not be coextensive.295 As
a practical matter, imposing different mens rea elements for donors and donees

290.
United States v. Gaines, Nos. 92-5446, 92-5501, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis
15310 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished).
291.
See supra Part V.D.2.a.i.
292.
909 F.2d 662, 690–93 (2d Cir. 1990).
293.
Id. at 681.
294.
See Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 681; United States v. Previte, 648 F.2d 73, 81–82.
Generally, courts hold that aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2 requires a mens rea of
intent to promote the underlying crime. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 920
(6th Cir. 1972); see generally SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL)
§ 4.01(2)(C) (2001) (requiring a mens rea for aiding and abetting of “intent” to help commit
the underlying crime). But the Biaggi court discusses the defendant’s mens rea in terms of
knowledge, and it follows that up by citing cases holding that an aider and abetter must have
the same mental state as the principal. 909 F.2d at 681.
295.
See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing
United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 340
F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1965)).
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would be relatively easy because the statute covers these actors in separate
subsections.296
Considering the liability of the donor and donee as distinct questions,
what mens rea term is appropriate for donees? Conviction should require
knowledge of the facts. In other words, public officials must know that they are
federal public officials who received a thing of value for or because of their
official position. If the official did not know all these items, the mens rea element
would not be met and the public official would not be liable. This mens rea
element would require, inter alia, that donees know they received a gift for or
because of their official position. If they thought they received the gift based on a
personal relationship, they would have a failure-of-proof defense that they lacked
the mens rea.297
Although knowledge of the facts should be required, knowledge of the
law should not be required. With these defendants, who are necessarily public
officials, the law can safely rely on the background presumption of the common
law that defendants know the law.298 This presumption is particularly appropriate
in the context of the gratuities crime where all the defendants who are donees
would necessarily be government employees who are trained.299 They should be
careful.300
And what mens rea is most appropriate for defendants who are donors?
As with donees, the mens rea should require knowledge of the facts. This means
296.
Donors are covered in 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) and donees are covered in
§ 201(c)(1)(B).
297.
For such a defense, the defendants would have to establish that they thought
it was exclusively based on personal factors—see mixed-motive cases, previously discussed
in Part II.
298.
Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998); Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991).
299.
See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2009),
aff’d, 649 F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recounting evidence that defendant attended ethics
training course required annually of all GSA employees and that he received ethics training
materials).
300.
See Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh & Williams, JJ., concurring):
Covered public officials who want to stay clearly on the safe side of the
criminal-law line (not to mention comply with the phalanx of
non-criminal regulatory provisions in this area) therefore would be
well-advised not to accept certain gifts in the first place, rather than
pinning their hopes on after-the-fact arguments premised on statutory
terms such as “in return for” or “official act” or “official duty.” In other
words, absent an authorization or exception, public officials might
decline monetary gifts and ensure that trips, tickets, and the like are paid
for by the officials themselves, by the government when so allowed, or
(in the case of elected officials) by a campaign or political committee
when so allowed. That’s certainly simpler, cleaner, and cheaper than
attempting to argue afterwards that a particular gift was not linked to an
official action.
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that donors would have to know that they gave a thing of value to a federal public
official for or because of the official’s position.
At this point, the best mens rea for donors and donees diverges. In
addition to knowledge of the facts, conviction of donors should require knowledge
of the law. Donors should be liable for the gratuities crime only if they knew it was
illegal to give things of value to public officials for or because of their official
position. Donors are not public officials but are presumably private citizens. They
are not trained. This requirement of knowledge of illegality responds to courts’
concerns that the crime does not provide notice and fair warning to the average
citizen that the conduct is criminal.301 The Supreme Court has endorsed requiring
knowledge of illegality when the criminal conduct is not “inevitably nefarious”302
or “inherently malign.”303 Giving a gift to a public official for or because of his or
her official position falls handily into the category of crimes that should require
knowledge of illegality. This crime for donors warrants an exception to the general
rule that ignorance of law is no defense.
When Congress uses the term “willfully” to require the government to
prove that the defendant knew his conduct was illegal, one question that arises is
what level of knowledge the government must prove to satisfy this requirement.304
Does the defendant have to know of the particular statute he is violating, or is
knowledge that the conduct is generally illegal sufficient? In United States v.
Bryan,305 the Supreme Court concluded that the term “willfully” in a firearm
statute requires only general knowledge of illegality.306 Congress apparently agrees
with this interpretation, because in 2010, it added a definition of the term willfully
to the healthcare fraud statute that adopts this position.307 If this approach, which
was adopted by the Court in Bryan and by Congress for healthcare fraud, was
applied to the term “willfully” in the gratuities statute, this would mean that the
government only has to prove that donors knew generally that gifting because of
position was illegal. The government would not have to prove that the donor knew
of § 201(c)(1)(A) and intended to violate it.

301.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 411 (1999);
Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1323.
302.
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144 (1994).
303.
Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703–04 (2005).
304.
See, e.g., United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2004).
305.
524 U.S. 184 (1998).
306.
Id. at 195 n.23, 196.
307.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (2012). No legislative history explains Congress’s
purpose in adding this definition to § 1347(b) exactly, but Congress made the same change
at the same time to another healthcare fraud statute, the anti-kickback statute (42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b) (2012)), and the legislative history of that addition states that the purpose is
to make it clear that the government need only prove “that the defendant knew that the
conduct in question was unlawful, but not that it was a violation of the anti-kickback statute
per se.” See JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
LAWS AFFECTING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2010), available at
http://aging.senate.gov/crs/medicaid20.pdf.
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Congress can impose these mens rea requirements relatively easily. The
Supreme Court generally interprets the term “knowingly” in criminal statutes to
require knowledge of the facts but not the law.308 The Supreme Court generally
interprets the term “willfully” in criminal statutes to require knowledge of
illegality.309 Thus, the gratuities statute could require the mens reas discussed
above by providing that donees would be liable if they acted “knowingly” and
donors would be liable if they acted “knowingly and willfully.” Once these mens
rea elements were added, they would carry along with them the usual mens rea
doctrines: Jurors would be instructed that knowledge could be established by proof
of willful blindness310 and that they could infer the defendants’ mens reas based on
the defendants’ conduct.311
This approach to avoiding overcriminalization, which is based on the
criminal law’s traditional way of avoiding overcriminalization by relying on the
limiting impact of a mens rea element, has benefits for both the individual
gratuities crime and for federal criminal law generally. For the crime, the addition
of the mens rea element will resolve the confusion over mens rea discussed earlier
in the Article.312 To the extent the courts have established any coherent mens rea,
the one proposed is consistent with that case law in requiring a mens rea of
knowledge of the facts for donees. The proposed mens reas (knowledge of the
facts for donees and knowledge of the facts and law for donors) also add an
appropriate differentiation in the scope of the crime for public officials and private
citizens. By requiring knowledge of the law for donors, the mens rea element
responds to concerns that the crime may not provide adequate notice.313
For federal criminal law generally, the addition of mens rea terms is also
healthy. Congress should consider and include these important elements when it
adopts the crime rather than just leave the matter to the courts for case-by-case
definition.314

308.
See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193 & n.15 (characterizing Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419 (1985) as an exception to this rule).
309.
See id. at 193; Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141–49 (1994); Cheek
v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 446
(1894); see also United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
310.
See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
banc); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
311.
SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), § 2.08(2)–(4)
(2011) (inferring required mental state); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615
n.10 (1994) (“We, of course, express no view concerning the inferences a jury may have
drawn regarding petitioner’s knowledge from the evidence in the case.”).
312.
See supra Part V.D.2.
313.
See, e.g., Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
314.
See Myers, supra note 11, at 1878.
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VI. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this Article, I discussed how the crime of gratuities should apply to
four situations.315 Comparing these four situations among themselves helps sort out
and identify the relative harm of each.
A. Locating These Four Situations on a Continuum of Harm
If these four possible applications of the gratuities crime are arranged on a
single continuum of harm, the least harmful is obviously personal gifts, which are
appropriately not criminal at all. These can be characterized as having a zero
percent risk of harm. At the other end of the spectrum, gifts because of an official
act to be performed in the future present the greatest likelihood of harm. Here, the
likelihood of bias and influence on government process is so great that the crime
should be classified as a type of bribery. We would locate the two remaining
situations—gifting because of past official acts and gifting because of the donee’s
position—between these two poles, again based on the likelihood of harm in the
form of biased public officials. These two situations are dangerous to equality in
government, but the danger is not as certain as when the gift is tied to a particular
future act. These situations are appropriately treated as the crime of gratuities. The
idea that political corruption crimes can be effectively defined by analyzing the
harm caused by the conduct has recently been persuasively articulated by Lisa
Kern Griffin.316 She argues that although political corruption crimes are difficult to
define with precision, focusing on the harm the conduct causes to the political
system—in the form of distortion to public officials’ neutral decisionmaking—is
the best way to mark out the contours of corruption crimes.317 That analysis is
useful here in defining the appropriate scope of the gratuities crime; this is because
social science research establishes that the harm to society presented by donors
gifting officials due to their positions is not limited to the appearance of
impropriety but is based on the risk of actual bias in public officials’ conduct.318
B. Specifics: Proposed Amendments
To implement the changes to the crime of gratuities proposed in this
Article, Congress needs to amend the statute. The version below includes the
changes suggested in this Article. Deleted material is indicated by a strike-through
and new material is indicated by an underline.
(c) Whoever otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge
of official duty—
(1) directly or indirectly knowingly and willfully gives, offers, or
promises anything of value to any public official, former public
official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of
315.
See supra Part I.C.
316.
Lisa Kern Griffin, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal System: The Federal
Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815 (2011).
317.
Id. at 1817–18.
318.
See id. at 1837; see also supra Part V.B.1.
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(A) the official’s position, or
(B) any official act performed or to be performed by such public
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public
official;
or
(2) being a public official, former public official, or person selected
to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the
proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly knowingly
demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept
anything of value personally for or because of
(A) the official’s position or
(B) any official act performed or to be performed by such
official or person;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both.
Changes in the statutory subsection on gratuities include the amendments
advocated in this Article. One change is that forward-looking gratuities have been
eliminated because they are indistinguishable from bribery. This change was
implemented by deleting the words “or to be performed” following the term
official act.319 The second change is that a status-based theory of liability was
added. In other words, donors and donees may now be liable for the crime of
gratuities if they give or receive things of value because of the donee’s position.
This change is manifested by adding the words “the official’s position” following
the phrase “for or because of.”320 The third amendment is that mens rea terms have
been added to the statute. As described above, the donor will be required to have a
mens rea of knowledge of the facts (knowledge that they are giving a thing of
value to a public official for or because of the official’s position or official act
performed) and knowledge that such conduct is illegal. This change was
implemented by adding the terms “knowingly and willfully” to the subsection
covering donors.321 For donees, a mens rea of knowingly has been added, which
requires that those defendants have knowledge of the facts (knowledge that they
are receiving a thing of value for or because of their position or official act
performed) but not knowledge of the law.322 In addition, the proposed new
subsection on gratuities includes some minor323 and stylistic changes.324

319.
The words “or to be performed” were deleted from 18
U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(B) (2012).
320.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A).
321.
See id. § 201(c)(1).
322.
See id. § 201(c)(2).
323.
The proposed subsection includes four minor changes. In the subsection on
donees, subsection (c)(2), the word “personally” has been deleted for two reasons. This
word is inconsistent in that it does not appear in the subsection on donors, and this word is
not important in that it has not been discussed in any of the case law. In both subsections,

2013]

FEDERAL CRIME OF GRATUITIES

463

C. Attitude of Congress and the Courts
Congress may be receptive to the idea of modifying the gratuities crime
as suggested in this Article. In the past, Congress has reacted to Supreme Court
decisions that narrow a crime by amending the statute to reverse the Court.325
Although the Senate was considering a bill to expand various political corruption
crimes, including gratuities, the bill recently died.326
Defining gratuities because of an official’s position as a crime is
consistent with the Court’s reliance on analyzing the nature and extent of the harm
in the criminal context and in the political corruption context. Gifting to public
officials because of their positions can be defined as conduct where injury in the
form of biased public officials is sufficient to warrant criminalizing the conduct.327
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court concluded that a judge’s refusal to
recuse himself was a violation of the Due Process Clause.328 The Court’s
evaluation of the harm did not depend on finding that the judge was actually
biased,329 nor on finding that the judge’s participation in the case presented the
appearance of impropriety. Rather, the Court’s analysis focused on the objective
probability of actual bias.330 Under this approach, when a donor transfers value to a
public official because of his or her position, the recent influence research shows a
significant objective risk that the public official will be biased; the harm is not
limited to the appearance of impropriety. This decision supports the proposal to
expand the crime of gratuities, although other Supreme Court decisions can be
found which suggest the Court might not initiate such an expansion on its own.331
the phrase “directly or indirectly” has been deleted because it has no meaning and has never
come up in the courts. In the subsection on donees, subsection (c)(2), the phrase “otherwise
than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty” has been deleted because
it is redundant. Finally, some language was deleted in the last line of the subsection on
donors, subsection (c)(1), because it was unnecessary and also inconsistent with the
language used in subsection (c)(2).
324.
The stylistic change was that the outline headings were reordered to be more
efficient and to clearly indicate alternatives. The new outline headings would require
renumbering current subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) as (c)(3) and (c)(4), respectively.
325.
See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), rev’d by Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 § 411, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5322(a), (b), 5324(c) (2012) (crime of structuring transactions); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), rev’d by 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (crime of mail fraud).
326.
See Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401, 112th Cong.
(as introduced in the Senate, Feb. 17, 2011). The Senate did not take action and the
proposed 2011 bill died.
327.
Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (noting that “injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects” is generally necessary for the government
to make conduct unlawful).
328.
556 U.S. 868, 890 (2009).
329.
Id. at 2263.
330.
Id. at 2263, 2265.
331.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910–
11 (2010) (stating that the appearance of influence will not harm democratic governance
and that ingratiation and access are not corruption); see also Brown, supra note 11, at 1372–
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CONCLUSION
This Article urges Congress to extend the crime of gratuities to cover gifts
because of an official’s position rather than leave the crime to cover only gifts
because of particular official acts. The danger of gifting based on official positions
to bias-free government is demonstrated in the recent research on influence and
reciprocity. This influence is especially dangerous because participants are
oblivious to its impact. This conduct is not adequately controlled by mandated
disclosure or ethics prohibitions. When Congress amends the gratuities crime to
expand it, Congress can avoid the dangers of overcriminalization by inserting mens
rea elements into the statute, which it should have incorporated when it first
drafted the statute. The appropriate mens rea terms are knowledge of the facts for
donees and knowledge of the facts and law for donors. A secondary point of this
Article is that Congress should remove one situation, when donors transfer value
to donees because of future official acts, out of the gratuities crime because it is
indistinguishable from the crime of bribery. With these changes, the federal crime
of gratuities will be revived.

74 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s attitude as of 2006 toward political corruption as it bears
on gratuities).

